Turkey’s Kurds and human rights reforms

After 1999, when PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured in Kenya, the PKK reached the point of dispersing, following Ocalan’s call for the armed members of the PKK to put down their guns and get out of Turkey. Then the PKK/KADEK group changed strategy and they started to give priority to diplomatic and political efforts under these new circumstances. The PKK has been involved in a major "diplomacy drive" trying to justify its struggle and legitimize its position as a "representative of Turkey’s Kurds" rather than a terrorist organization. Propaganda and diplomacy have thus become its main objectives for the future. In this aspect, Turkey realized the importance of this and changed its "psychological warfare" mechanism.

Within this framework, the leading human rights’ reforms were triggered by the former coalition government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit last year, and then finalized by Prime Minister Abdullah Gul’s government as essential to the success of Turkey’s candidacy for full membership in the European Union. However, this reform, including broadcast and education in the Kurdish language, was interrupted by the US-led war in Iraq. Turkey’s fear that a Kurdish state — there already was a de facto Kurdish state due to the U.S.’s Operation Northern Iraq Watch protecting northern Iraq since the Gulf War in 1991– might be established in northern Iraq if the war in Iraq caused a vacuum there and this might also embolden Turkey’s Kurds to seek further rights.

Despite the legislating of this reform recognizing a "Kurdish Identity" on a cultural basis, the wall created by the point of view of state administrators vis-a-vis the Kurdish problem could not yet be completely torn down. With the passing of time, it seems there will always be some hurdle or other that could come up following the war in Iraq. All Turkey needs to do to terminate PKK/KADEK is to put this reform into practice and additionally push Turkey’s only pro-Kurdish political party, the Democratic Peoples’ Party (DEHAP), into the political arena to prevent the PKK from showing itself as the representative of Turkey’s Kurds.

After the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the region settled down. But the region and its people, who lived under Emergency Rule (OHAL) for about 18 years, continued to suffer; hundreds of thousands of people forced to leave their villages have not yet been able to return, while those who have returned have encountered problems with village guards. All the people who lived under the OHAL rules have still not been able to escape from the psychological pressure they endured.

In addition, the most important problem seems to be the economic crippling of the southeastern region. Unfortunately, the region has been ignored in this regard as much as it has been in terms of human rights. The region’s backward economy has been damaged day after day. The sources of livelihood in the region such as farming and agriculture slid into recession because farmers and herders were prohibited from carrying out their business during the crippling struggle with the PKK.

Furthermore, another livelihood, the limping border trade, was halted by the Turkish government’s decision to close the border gates with Iraq. Hundreds of trucks working between Turkey and Iraq were towed to parking areas as a result of this closure. They now look forward to the reopening of these gates. However, it seems that the problem with Kurdish entities is not solved, so these gates will not be opened, at least not just yet.

After all this, a question rises in people’s minds as to whether or not an oil-rich Kurdish entity in northern Iraq would attract Turkey’s Kurds who have blood ties with Iraqi Kurds. When one looks at the social and educational standard of Turkey’s Kurds in comparison with that of the Iraqi Kurds, who are still deeply embedded in a feudal structure, one can say that this situation has been left far behind by most of Turkey’s Kurds except in rural areas. On the other hand, as thousands of Turkey Kurds migrated to the western cities of Turkey or abroad to get a better life because of the economic plight of their areas, some could also migrate to an oil-rich northern Iraq. In view of the social and educational differences between Turkey’s Kurds and Iraqi Kurds, the only factor that might push Turkey’s Kurds into northern Iraq seems to be economic conditions.

However, Turkey can turn this situation to its own benefit by investing in the region to prevent northern Iraq from appearing to be highly attractive. Furthermore, a region that has been ignored for 20 years deserves this.