How to get out of the EU?

The biggest benefit of the Dec. 17 decision was to prevent the collapse of the stock markets (with U.S. help) and another economic crisis. We can only wait and see whether direct foreign investment will increase or not.

The nature of the Dec. 17 decision does not remove the uncertainties that dominated our EU process until now. On the contrary, it increases it. You can also add the referenda in France and Austria to this confusing picture.
It appears Cyprus is the basis of this problem. Due to Turkish efforts, Greek Cypriot demands to be recognized as the Republic of Cyprus before Dec. 17 was not satisfied. If we try to explain the confounding 19th paragraph of the decision, we come up with this picture. The adaptation protocol to be attached to the Ankara Agreement will be negotiated with the European Commission for the harmonization of the 10 new members. After an agreement is reached, it will be signed before the start of the accession negotiations with Turkey.

Adaptation to the customs union is a technical issue. It’s being done to prevent misdirection in the trade of goods. In the past, these adaptation protocols were signed with Spain and Portugal and were implemented even though the parliaments of these countries did not ratify them. Sweden, Finland and Austria had adapted without signing a protocol. Due to Greek Cypriot insistence, the matter became politicized. The Greek Cypriots believe if there is a signature of the republic of Cyprus next to Turkey’s, it will be recognized. However, if we cite our reservation that this does not mean recognition, they will still be unrecognized. While some, including German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, say this would be tantamount to recognition, EU term president the Netherlands’ prime minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, said it could be considered a step towards recognition.
However, this is not the real problem. When such a condition was attached to the date given to start the negotiations, Oct. 3, 2005, it lost most of its meaning. On the other hand, EU insistence on the recognition issue legitimized Greek Cypriot efforts to force on us their own solution, even though they were the ones who snubbed a solution by rejecting the Annan plan. We will see many demands for a clearer recognition before Oct. 3. The Greek Cypriots will find the strength to reject our efforts to cite our reservations in the protocol. The only option left is to resolve the Cyprus issue by Oct. 3. Under all this pressure, it will be very hard to produce a just solution.

Those with a minimum experience in diplomacy know that most of the EU countries, especially France and Germany, do not support the Greek Cypriot thesis as much as they appeared to during the summit. Abusing our sensitivities for Cyprus and making sure it dominated the summit may be due to their intention to force us to accept all their demands without any negotiations.
The second sub-paragraph of the 23rd paragraph is even more important for them than Cyprus. The paragraph in question sets long transition periods, derogations, special arrangements or permanent protection clauses and gives member countries wide discretion regarding many topics like freedom of movement, structural policies and farming. Derogations included in the accession treaty and then in the eventually in the EU Constitution, with our volition, cannot be removed when we become members. The commission will formulate the “method of negotiations” based on this decision, and as a result will start the negotiations with these limitations. We will in fact be forced to accept a “privileged partnership.”

If Ismet Pasha (Inönü) had not left in the middle of the peace conference after the Independence War, we would not have had the Lausanne Treaty. If we had done the same, would our losses have been any less serious then now?
All the conditions of abandoning the EU membership process are now in place.