Who’s changing?

Keyman says: "Europe, which claims Turkey is different, represents sentimentality and fear. We can’t turn a blind eye to the European approach becoming segregationist when it comes to Turkey. … We should not attach too much importance to the EU’s influence over resolving Turkey’s problems.” Later on Keyman suggests that those who are against the “state-centered, nationalist and anti-Europe stance” not champion European integration. In the end he says, “Debates on cultural identities are limited to the cultural sphere,” but notes that some object to our membership (like France) on political grounds (in other words, on rational grounds).

Knowing such a summary will do injustice to the authors, I still would like to offer my opinion.

Both liberal intellectuals, who believed that if Turkey adhered to the Copenhagen criteria no obstacles would remain, now are very cautious towards the EU. The injustice done to the Turkish side on the issue of Cyprus and the intense and hurtful criticisms aired on cultural (in other words, religious) grounds on the eve of the Dec. 17 summit might have had an influence in this change of attitude. In other words, this development, which can be described as a transformation of opinions, came about only after some facts became apparent.

However, these objections to our membership based on cultural differences have been explained in detail in Turgut Özal’s book, “Turkey in Europe” (K. Rüstem and Brothers, 1991). The University of Virginia Center of Human Mind and Human Interaction study in 1992, “Etiology of New Racism,” which was contracted for by the Foreign Ministry, explains the mechanism of promoting Turkey as the “other” and its segregation in detail. Later on, numerous studies and books were published on the topic. I have written many articles on the subject in Radikal since 1998. The basis of all these studies is Professor Vamık Volkan’s, “The Need to Have Enemies and Allies” (Aronson, New Jersey and London, 1988).

Our intellectuals have tried to find an answer to this “otherness” mechanism in the wrong place — sociology — and consequently have failed to find what they need. They may be right in pointing to Europe’s fears about Turkey, but their citing of “sentimentality” does not mean much. Seeing Europe as generally rational and the East as irrational is the basis of their mistake. Today’s humanity is more influenced by our irrational sides than our rational ones. Developed culture, instead of actually making them more rational, merely gives them the opportunity to appear more rational. In other words, it helps them rationalize their attitudes and statements. How can a continent that experienced the Holocaust 50 years ago eliminate its “otherness” mechanism and become rational in such a short time?

Neither author tells us anything about Europe’s historical prejudices and their prejudice against the Muslim diaspora in their midst. Under such conditions, Keyman is able to limit debates on cultural identity within the cultural sphere. However, such a mechanism of “otherness” shapes their whole perception about us and their opinions and attitudes towards us.

Arnold Toynbee, referring to ancient Greece, says great civilizations turn their surroundings to regions of peace with their civilization, not weapons. The West, due to its failure to eradicate this “otherness” mechanism despite its great civilization, is breeding a region of enmity in its surroundings. It wants us to become a borderline shield between itself and the surrounding region. This is the fact that lies beneath the rising nationalism against the EU.

Liberals can only realize this fact when they fall victim to it, while nationalists instinctively recognize it. Just like when leftists found out about political liberalism during the Sept. 12, 1980 military regime.