What Did Turkey loose by refusing the March 1 license?

Both of the countries had long negotiated before the license (to use the Turkish border) was voted in Turkish Parliament.

Turkey had given the impression to the U.S. and to the world that the license would be easily offered to the U.S. and the Americans had made preparations based on this assumption.

Moreover, some Turks also assumed that the war without opening the northern border could not start so they urged the Turkish Government to make stiff negotiations.

But when the License was voted on March 1 in Turkish Parliament — then after called "March 1st License" — astonishing all involved parties it was voted out by the PM’s of the ruling party AK Party of the present Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

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The refusal of the license for sure cooled off Turkish-U.S. relations then.

But the discussions whether Turkey lost or gained by refusing the license has never ended.

I myself always protected the view that "for her own sake" Turkey should have and still must be openly involved with the "Iraqi problem".

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The released document identifies the issues Turkey and the U.S. had agreed upon if the license had passed Parliament.

According to Fikret Bila the non-practiced agreement carries very important advantages for Turkey.

Some of them are:

1) The Turkish Army would also enter northern Iraq following the U.S. Army.

(Today, The Turkish Army is not welcomed in northern Iraq under any condition.)

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2) Both parties would strictly control the oil rich cities of Mousul and Kirkuk. The Kurdish forces would not be allowed to enter both of the cities. The Turkish Army could not also go into these cities but would be allowed to oversee that all involved parties obey the agreement.

(Today, the Kurds can enter and even control these oil rich cities.)

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3) Turkish Army would not combat with Kurdish Forces. But there would be one exception: The PKK! The famous terrorist Kurdish group that caused the death of thousands of soldiers and civilians in the last 10 years would be supervised by Turkey.

(Today PKK’s "fate" is all handled by the independent decisions of the U.S.)

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4) The Kurdish forces of both Talabani and Barzani would be controlled both by the U.S. and Turkey. They would not be allowed to carry heavy weaponry and even the weaponry distributed to them before under Turkey’s control would be taken back.

(Today, Kurdish forces in northern Iraq is only "controlled" by the U.S. and they are forming their semi-independent state was a reason for war according to Ankara before. Moreover the future of Turcomans, whom we consider our brothers are totally under Kurdish control now.)

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It is obvious from this document that Turkey lost a great opportunity to be directly involved with the reshaping of the Middle East