Intellectuals and the Kurdish Identity

The Kurdish issue is an example of ethnic nationalism. If the matter was limited to accepting the Kurdish identity there would be no danger. Balkan and Caucasian groups, with their different languages, customs and traditions, do not constitute a danger to the republic. These groups are proud to belong to the higher concept of Turkishness, which is an ethnically weak but historically and culturally strong identity, and they are loyal to the state.

On the other hand, the thesis that Kurds would be happier in a Turkey that is a member of the European Union shows that loyalty and the feeling of belonging to the Turkish nation and state is interpreted purely as advantages gained. Such a conditional belonging is inadequate for a nation-state.

Actually, the Kurdish problem started with the Sheikh Sait revolt in 1925. This revolt aimed at preserving religion’s place within the state, before the republic was even 18-months-old. Britain, who wanted to hold on to Mosul, needed to prove Turks and Kurds could not live together. The bloody way the revolt was put down traumatized the Kurds with the ensuing Agri and Dersim revolts deepening this trauma.

Kurds then contradicted themselves by rebelling against the state, while demanding services from it at the same time. Kurdish businessmen moved to the west of the country and the region remained poor.

After the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) defeat, armed Kurdish separatism lost significant support. The political arm of the movement is now increasing its demands and is seemingly impervious to the fact that they lost the war. The released former Democracy Party (DEP) deputies, including Leyla Zana, aim to exceed the cultural rights and the Kurdish identity granted by the Copenhagen Criteria. It appears they are thinking of a federation or a regional autonomy. They are dreaming of developments akin those occuring in northern Iraq to start happening in Turkey.

There are other negative aspects of today’s Kurdish identity, in addition to the consequences of their past defeats. Kurds, by choosing to become entangled in a spiral of violence, have remained outside the modernization process. Turkish "intellectuals," while supporting the separatist Kurdish demands in the name of democracy and human rights, ignored the matter of modernization. These intellectuals feared exclusion by the Kurds if they were critical of this matter, or more appropriately, if they "forced the things that had to be done from above."

Such an attitude is also prevalent in western human rights supporters. While supporting Kurdish human rights, they seem oblivious to the widespread clan structure, polygamy, "honor killings," organized crime and abuse of the rights of women and children in Kurdish society. They hide these violations behind a broader term of "Turks."

Such a sterile intellectual stance does no good to Kurds. Western human rights supporters appear to desire the division of Turkey more than they want better living standards for Kurds.

The concept of human rights is being used to cover up the demands serving certain interests. We are told to adhere to these interests without assessing them. However, Kurdish demands are about a community that has failed to modernize and chooses autonomy and/or independence with violence as its mechanism.

What is dangerous for Turkey is not recognizing the Kurdish identity or their cultural rights. The real danger, from the sociological perspective, is a community that has failed to modernize and is consequently failing to integrate with the rest of society and is becoming practically separate while living within the same borders. The politicians of this community have no other proposal apart from violence. In this respect, Kurds carry all the characteristics of being a society that will be targeted by the Greater Middle East Initiative in order to prevent the spread of terrorism.

Zana and her friends are the cause of the problem.