Greece Had A Promising Drone Program Long Before Turkey Did. Now Athens Lags Behind. What Happened?

As Greece undertakes the most significant buildup and upgrade of its air force’s fighter fleet in decades, some charge that the country wasted promising opportunities to develop its indigenous arms industry, especially its drone program. Was that indeed the case?

A recent editorial in the Greek City Times aptly summarized this view. It laments the fact that, despite having a promising drone program “far ahead of its time,” Athens never became a significant producer and exporter of drones.

Greece began development on the HAI E1-79 Pegasus surveillance drone all the way back in 1979. The Pegasus made its first flight by 1982 and entered service with the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) in 1992. An upgraded version, the Pegasus II, was introduced in 2005. Greece ultimately never exported either version or built them in large numbers.

Hellenic Air Force F-16 fighter jet.

Pieter Stroobach via Wikimedia Commons

Turkey’s Baykar Defense was founded decades later and produced the Bayraktar TB2 armed drone in the 2010s. The TB2 became well-known after its combat successes in multiple modern conflicts and was sold to approximately 30 countries worldwide in a mere three years.

“It is indicative that the Turks started with Bayraktar in 2014, when the Greeks made the first plans in 1979,” read the editorial.

In a comment quoted in the Turkish press, the leader of Greece’s opposition SYRIZA party declared, during a May 10 televised debate, “It is unacceptable that a program of 14-15 billion euros ($15.3-16.4 billion) has not brought a single euro to the Greek defense industry while Turkey linked 60 percent of its defense to its national industry.”

Athens is indeed spending big to improve its military by importing big-ticket items, especially fighter jets. It has ordered 24 Dassault Rafale jets from France, is upgrading 83 of its F-16s to the latest Block 72 configuration, and is buying at least 20 fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II stealth jets. These acquisitions could give Greece’s fighter fleet a technological edge over its larger Turkish rival.

But did Greece make a fatal error by not investing more in its drone capabilities?

In another comment reproduced in the Turkish press, the leader of the Greek Solution party questioned the wisdom of the fighter buildup in the face of Turkey’s growing drone arsenal in a 2022 interview.

“What difference would it make if we buy 200 Rafale jets?” said Kyriakos Velopoulos. “Turks will surround us with 400 drones.”

Greece is buying some drones but not many. In July 2022, Athens approved the purchase of three MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones from the United States for an estimated $400 million to improve the Hellenic military’s maritime surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Other countries have come to regret investing too heavily in fighter jet procurements at the expense of developing their drone capabilities.

Armenia had several promising indigenous drone projects, including several designs for different types of loitering munitions — single-use drones that destroy their targets by crashing into them and exploding. But Yerevan instead invested its limited funds into buying a small fleet of Su-30SM Flanker fighter jets from Russia to give its fighter fleet an edge over its neighbor and rival Azerbaijan.

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh, the four Flankers Russia delivered to Armenia sat idle as Azerbaijan devastated Armenian air defenses with its Israeli Harop loitering munitions and destroyed large numbers of Armenian main battle tanks with its Turkish Bayraktar TB2s.

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“Greece is currently in the process of transforming and modernizing its defense industry. The discussion about drones is placed in this context,” said George Tzogopoulos, a senior fellow at the Centre International de Formation Européenne (CIFE). “There is consensus among political elites in the country that Greece needs to invest more in research and development in order to enhance the capacity of the national defense industry to supply the military with qualitative and innovative equipment.”

He explained that when Greece, regardless of the incumbent government, imports military equipment, “much of the discussion is synthesized around the place where this material would be produced.”

“So, Greece is seeking to turn a page – and as much as possible link military co-operation with its partners to the development of the national defense industry,” he said. “Obviously, typical transaction military deals still take place, especially taking into account the current threat the country is encountered with. Τhe MQ-9B SeaGuardian case complements others, in particular the usage of drones from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).”

Tzogopoulos also outlined the “many reasons” Greece’s defense industry “lagged behind.” These included “maladministration in the previous decades” along with “high-level of politicization” when appointing personnel in important positions. On top of that, the debilitating economic crisis of the late 2000s worsened the situation since it forced several state-owned enterprises to slash expenses.

Now, Greece is trying to catch up, and while it needs more time, it also has a sense of urgency given its present threat perceptions.

“Among other things, Greece is attempting to invite investors from abroad and facilitate the process,” Tzogopoulos said.

The Israeli defense company SK Group and Plasan purchased ELVO, the Greek manufacturer of wheeled and tracked vehicles, as part of this process. Funds from the European Defense Fund are also playing an important role, especially since Russia infamously invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

“Certainly, we cannot turn the clock back and erase now pathogenies that led to the 2010 economic crisis, but Greece seems to have learned a lesson that will now possibly help it develop its drone manufacturing capacity,” Tzogopoulos said.

He is skeptical that Armenia’s recent experience represents a possible precedent or warning for Greece.

“Every type of war that breaks out helps countries located in turbulent zones carefully study the situation,” he said. “Yerevan’s experience is useful, but even without analyzing it, Greece’s choices would have been straightforward.”

“The task is multifaceted because the threat is multifaceted,” he added. “More importantly, Greece needs to simultaneously reinforce its army, air force, and navy to deter Turkey without neglecting domestic manufacturing opportunities or losing time. This needs a holistic policy.”

“That is why Greece’s partnership with Israel is strategic for the country’s national interest, especially in learning about the contribution of research and development to the military sector in the new era.”

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