Cyprus: A floating ghost

All in all, it is imperative in democratic practice to respect the result of the public vote. Looking at the recent EU history, one should not, though, underestimate the chances of efforts to exploit the vote result some time in the future. The experience of Denmark and Ireland, both of which voted to reject previous EU treaties, suggests that a likely but remote outcome may be that, after minor amendments in their favor, the Greek Cypriots may be asked to vote again, depending on how the international community treats the Turkish Cypriots.

The wording of the new vote, if there is going to be one, may be vital for a successful result. A little trick may work. Here is one idea: why not, next time, formulate the wording so that those who vote "no" should accept in advance to pay $10,000 each in contribution to George W. Bush’s election campaign?

For understandable reasons the Turkish Cypriots chose to co-habit, once again, with their ex-neighbors, end their political and economic isolation from the rest of the world and have a brighter future — in the EU. Their vote may as well be interpreted as a message en masse to reject their Turkish identity as well as their de facto link with a not-so-popular mainland. In a way, they voted for partition from Turkey. Their choice must be respected.

The vote in the south, on the other hand, does not mean that the Greek Cypriots categorically reject to co-habit with their Turkish compatriots, but that they refuse to co-habit under U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s terms. Their choice must be respected too.

But the Americans (and their European cousins) must have contingency plans, after investing so much on reunifying Cypriots. It’s time to see what the cowboys had meant when they promised that "they would not leave the Turkish Cypriots out in the cold." All the same, they may not have the time to feel sorry about the poor Turkish Cypriots, especially at a time when no sooner have they quenched one fire in Iraq then another flares up. Besides, the "warrior president" is too busy with his election campaign.

A recognition of the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state is unthinkable — save for the Azeri president, Ilham Aliyev, who must now be regretting the big words he said in Ankara only a few weeks ago (one wonders if Mr. Aliyev will keep his word and consider recognizing Rauf Denktas’s statelet — do the Azeris not often boast that they are men of honor?)

It would even be too optimistic to expect bold American moves to give relief to the Turkish Cypriots in the run up to presidential polls — candidates always keep in mind the sizeable Hellenic electorate. But there may surely be some cosmetic improvements, co-crafted by Washington and Brussels, such as the partial lifting of crippling trade sanctions on the north and easing of travelling restrictions to give the pro-settlement Turkish Cypriots some air to breathe.

President Tassos Papadopoulos thinks there are no winners or losers. He may be wrong. One man in Ankara has already made enormous gains from Sunday’s vote.

Is Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan simply a lucky man or a genius strategist? If it happens once, call it a coincidence, or pure luck; but if it happens twice, one must praise the prime minister.

Last October, Mr. Erdogan hastily passed a legislation to send Turkish peacekeeping troops to Iraq — making efforts to mend fences with an increasingly helpless American administration too much bogged down in Iraq. His political rivals were privately hoping for a fiasco in hostile Iraq and its natural political repercussions at home.

Mr. Erdogan chose to take the risk to win the bigger reward — to win, at that time, hearts and minds in Washington, after the historic March 1 vote had minimized the strategic alliance between Ankara and Washington. Well, the plan worked quite smoothly. Mr. Erdogan passed the controversial legislation, actually at a time when an angry public opinion urged him to send his own son to Iraq for fighting; got many gringo pats on his shoulder and, on top of all; he never had to send even one Turkish soldier to the diabolical terrain — after Iraqi and Kurdish opposition to Turkish troops, Washington and Ankara decided to climb down the stair they had climbed up hand in hand.

Mr. Erdogan gambled once again, this time in Cyprus, and on one card only: a not-so-secret reference that the Greek Cypriot game plan was based on Mr. Denktas’s intransigence, and that the Greek Cypriots could in fact vote down any reunification plan even if the Turkish Cypriots agreed to it (re: Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos, saying even if Mr. Denktas had stayed on the negotiating table early in 2003, he would have withdrawn — a tactic which Mr. Papadopoulos said worked well to blame Mr. Denktas for the impasse). Moving on from the tip, Mr. Erdogan merely wanted to throw away the hot potato for his EU inspirations — endless accusations from the international community to blame the partition on the Turks and their ethnic kin on the island.

Mr. Erdogan must be thankful for the hint. Just like the parliamentary vote to send troops to Iraq but not actually having to send them into an unknown, Mr. Erdogan has been able to remove the biggest single political obstacle against a date from the EU, but not actually having to "sell out" Cyprus, as his nationalistic opponents had campaigned before the referenda. In both cases, Iraq and Cyprus, he made major breakthrough, one with Washington and the other with Brussels, won much praise, and at zero political cost.

All the same, he may not get what he desperately wants from Brussels. The vote was a one-way road: failure to agree to Mr. Annan’s terms on Feb. 13, or a Greek Cypriot "yes" versus a Turkish Cypriot "no" would have categorically removed the possibility of a date for Mr. Erdogan.

However, neither Mr. Erdogan’s historic carte blanche for Mr. Annan, nor the Turkish Cypriot "yes" versus the Greek Cypriot "no" will guarantee a date for Turkey. Turkey-skeptics in the EU already have enough ammunition if they want to drag their feet — human rights failures, poor implementation of political reforms, et cetera.