Will Erdogan Finally Ratify Sweden’s NATO Accession? No One Knows.

The expectation that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will finally agree to support Sweden’s bid to join NATO has gone from “It’ll definitely happen after Erdogan gets reelected” to “Who knows—maybe?” The simple answer is that we don’t know, and, more importantly, Erdogan is in no particular rush to get it done. Washington and other NATO allies should temper their expectations and simply realize that there is not much more they can do to get Erdogan to play ball. It is now a waiting game—and that’s how it should be.

The expectation that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will finally agree to support Sweden’s bid to join NATO has gone from “It’ll definitely happen after Erdogan gets reelected” to “Who knows—maybe?” The simple answer is that we don’t know, and, more importantly, Erdogan is in no particular rush to get it done. Washington and other NATO allies should temper their expectations and simply realize that there is not much more they can do to get Erdogan to play ball. It is now a waiting game—and that’s how it should be.

Ahead of NATO’s 2022 Madrid summit, Turkey lifted its objections to admitting Finland and Sweden into the trans-Atlantic alliance and signed a joint memorandum with the two Nordic countries that outlined Helsinki’s and Stockholm’s intentions to take into consideration Turkey’s “security concerns.” Most officials at this point believed that NATO expansion was a done deal.

Since then, though, Erdogan has dithered on the issue of whether he will ask the Turkish parliament to ratify Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO. Turkey’s unpredictable populist president decided to draw out the accession process for months, citing unaddressed “security concerns” that he wanted met before Ankara could in good conscience say yes. Shortly before Turkey’s May elections, to demonstrate his goodwill to the alliance, Erdogan approved Finland’s membership bid, arguing that Sweden still needed to make progress.

In reality, this was an election stunt. Not having a positive economic message to sell to Turkish voters with an economy plagued by high inflation and a collapsing currency, Erdogan’s election campaign was a cacophony of divisive nationalism. In the arena of foreign policy, one component of his messaging rested on demonizing the West—and especially Sweden—for allegedly providing a safe haven for Kurdish separatists affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

NATO officials and Washington assumed that Erdogan’s ability to make hay out of this issue would end after the election was over. It has not, and recent developments have some analysts worried that Erdogan may continue to wield this as a political cudgel. A spike in pro-PKK protests in Stockholm is making Erdogan double down, arguing that the Swedish government needs to do more in the realm of extraditing PKK-affiliated individuals to Turkey and preventing pro-PKK rallies from taking place.

At this point, everybody should just sit back and see what Erdogan will do. There isn’t much that has not been attempted to make Erdogan see the light. In terms of goodwill gestures to address Ankara’s demands, Stockholm has offered credible measures including the passage of anti-terrorism legislation, and lifted an existing arms embargo. But to prevent peaceful protests or extradite individuals to Turkey without due process would undermine the very fabric of Sweden’s vast democratic rights and freedoms.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has been complimentary toward Erdogan, congratulating him personally at his reelection inauguration and reinforcing the view that the Swedish government had done its homework by concretely addressing Turkey’s concerns. Washington has also gone to bat for Erdogan by seeing if Congress might be willing to waive its objections to selling Turkey F-16 fighter jets if he comes through on NATO enlargement.

Moreover, there is very little by way of punishment if Ankara does deny Sweden NATO membership. There is ample merit in just laying out what you would like your treaty ally to do and what they gain or lose if they do not. In the event that Erdogan continues to delay or even outright denies Sweden’s NATO membership, it should be made clear that Turkey will not receive fighter jets from the United States. But other than not giving Turkey F-16s, what can the United States do? Very little.

The trick may be to just wait it out. Erdogan is desperate to get new jets, and for that, he has to deliver on a number of asks. In addition to letting Sweden into NATO, congressional authorities should want Turkey to lay out a timetabled plan as to how and when it will divest itself of its S-400 missiles. Turkish government officials like to argue that the reason Turkey opted for Russian S-400s over the U.S.-made Patriot system was because Washington did not want to sell it. Why does Washington not push back against this? Turkey was under no obligation to purchase U.S. technology and could have opted to purchase equivalents from Europe (the Eurosam system being one clear alternative).

The Biden administration is getting jittery, however. They are worried that a long and never-ending list of asks from Ankara may result in Erdogan pulling the plug and looking to acquire jets from alternative sources. This is a valid worry, but only to a point. Ankara doesn’t really have the ability to acquire fighter jets from Russia or China. It’s not simply a matter of buying jets. These platforms exist in a unique technological ecosystem that allows NATO militaries to be interoperable. To acquire fighters from non-allies would mean that Turkey would have to overhaul its entire NATO-compliant military industrial base, which is expensive and likely the ultimate bridge-burner with the West.

The White House should simply see through this concern and reiterate to Ankara that they can work together, provided that Turkey reinvents its vision for what it means to be a member of the Western alliance. The asks of Turkey should be specific, achievable, and not endless. After communicating these to Ankara, Washington and NATO allies should simply sit back and wait. Let’s see what Erdogan chooses to do by or at the Vilnius summit.

There is little sense in following Erdogan around and begging him to do the right thing time and time again. This only emboldens his conviction that the West needs him more than he needs the West. Tough love should be in order.