Why didn’t we go into action earlier?
In Dec. 2002, at an EU Summit in Copenhagen, the second version of the Annan plan was on the table. The United Nations Secretary-General had made some amendments on issues on which both sides were sensitive and the plan had become very favorable for the Turkish side.
It would have been enough if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) had accepted the plan. The Greek Cypriots would have had nothing to do and they would not have gained the right to join the European Union representing the whole of the island.
Denktas didn’t even go to Copenhagen. He sent his foreign minister and the minister opposed the plan immediately since he already favored a "no solution."
The inexperienced Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which had recently come to power then, just watched the developments. They could not even open their mouths. The military on one side and some circles at the Foreign Ministry on the other side scared Erdogan and Gul.
The Turkish side lost the biggest chance in Copenhagen. It couldn’t use the trump card in its hand and failed in preventing the Greek Cypriots gaining right to enter the EU.
Then, there came the Vienna opportunity.
In April 2003, the U.N. Secretary-General called the sides to convene and asked whether they accepted the plan. Denktas gave a blunt "No" before the Greeks even opened their mouths and returned victoriously. If he had waited a little bit more, he would have been able to corner the Greek side and made them say "no."
The trump cards we managed to save in Copenhagen all disappeared after Vienna.
Now, we are in a panic. We have suddenly realized what will happen if no solution is achieved by May 1.
We are cornered. We started to race against time.
So what has changed?
Did Kofi Annan change the plan?
No.
So what are we doing now?
We are accepting everything we rejected in Copenhagen and Vienna.
We are announcing that we will accept the framework and the core of the Annan plan and the referendum.
We could have voiced our demands for amendment of some details of the plan in Copenhagen or Vienna.
Why didn’t we do that?
Was the reason the fact that we could not overcome the resistance by Denktas or we couldn’t eliminate the confusion in Ankara?
Or did the government just watch the events since it didn’t know what to do?
Who will take responsibility for the time and advantages lost?
Now, we will seek backing from Bush
After being too late, now we will knock on Bush’s door. Today, Cyprus will be high on the agenda. However, Erdogan would have raised the issue of economic support or Iraq instead of Cyprus.
If Denktas is the one responsible for this situation, the other one is Ankara. From the president to the military, from the media to some academics all have responsibility for this situation.
It’s the same with the US
Aren’t we suffering from the same problem of being late with our relations with the United States?
Murat Yetkin explains in his book "Motion" what was experienced with the U.S. on the issue of Iraq. The Americans revealed their Iraq policies to Ankara months ago. They expressed their expectations.
What did we do?
We ignored the issue for a while. We thought that we could pass the issue over, wasting valuable time. We could have said, "We can lend our support to you up to this line, and after that we cannot support you," from the beginning and made ourselves clearly understood then we wouldn’t have trouble now.
What are we doing today?
We are proposing to the Americans the things we used to call "impossible."
Do we have to find the correct way every time after bumping into facts at the last minute?