Why America Needs Turkey in Iraq
Critics fear that the presence of Turkish forces would aggravate a historically tense relationship with neighboring Kurdish regions (Iraqi Kurds who control the northern third of the country immediately voiced apprehension about Turkish motives). In addition, Iraq’s new Governing Council has already said that no additional foreign troops are wanted in Iraq.
So, other than allowing a few thousand United States troops to return home at some point in the distant future (and even this is questionable), how much would Turkish peacekeepers contribute to the stability of Iraq?
Quite a lot, actually. Because they are Sunni Muslims from the same neighborhood, Turks are attuned to the cultural concerns and needs of the conservative (and by now irate) population in central Iraq. Sunni leaders remain alienated from the transition process in Baghdad, fearing Kurdish and Shiite domination and wary of Washington’s motives. Some are convinced they will be punished for Saddam Hussein’s misdeeds; others find "infidels" searching their homes and policing their towns an affront.
But Sunnis are as critical to Iraq’s stability as the Pashtun were to Afghanistan. Whatever structure emerges in Iraq cannot be hostile to this ancient elite. In this, Turks can serve as a bridge between the Sunnis and American troops, helping to ease the resistance to intervention and potentially overcoming the Saddam Hussein holdouts in the area. During meetings in Ankara and Iraq over the summer, Sunni clerics and tribal leaders told Turkish officials that, if it’s a question between American forces and Turks, they’ll take the latter.
Sending Turkish soldiers would also be the only real way to repair the Turkish-American alliance, much damaged since the Turkish Parliament’s decision in March to stay out of the war. Yes, there have been other "lows" in this half-century partnership, the strength of which was a crucial asset for Washington during the cold war and in containing Saddam Hussein over the last decade. But this time, Ankara not only lost a good deal in American aid, but was also sentenced to remain on the margins of events at the birth of a new Iraq.
Senior Defense Department officials openly blamed the Turkish military for "failing to provide leadership." Turkish companies were left out of major reconstruction bids. But what’s the point of shunning the most powerful democracy in the region when the United States has very few allies in Iraq? Critics of Turkish troop deployment should bear in mind that Ankara has made a strategic decision that "U.S. success in Iraq is in Turkey’s long-term interests," as told to American officials by the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, in a visit to Washington. This sets Turkey apart from Iraq’s other neighbors — and much of the Middle East and Europe.
Prosperity in Iraq would mean Turks could do business there; democracy would finally usher in a second Muslim parliamentary model; stability would guarantee that northern Iraq is no longer a staging ground for attacks against Turkish citizens by Turkey’s own Kurdish guerrillas, the Kurdistan Workers Party. Are there ulterior motives here? Yes, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was unstable, poor and dangerous for Turkey. Now there is a chance to change that.
Turkish troops have a good peacekeeping record in recent United States-led operations in Somalia, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. But with much of the Turkish public still opposed to war in Iraq, Turks are concerned about being seen as part of the unpopular occupation, or even as "America’s gendarmerie." They want to connect with Iraqis. What they want is for troops to arrive as part of a larger community-building initiative aimed at providing basic services. Their plan, according to interviews with Turkish officials, involves working with hospitals, university exchange programs and schools, and even supplying farmers with new-generation tomato seeds. Ambitious, but in no way contemptible.
A member of the Iraqi Governing Council told me over the phone this week, "Having Turks here will be good for Iraq, and bad for Kurdish nationalists." But, he added, he would not voice his approval within the council, which is dominated by Kurdish leaders. It is therefore up to American officials to do more to explain to the council the benefits of a Turkish presence in Iraq. Kurdish leaders should in turn stop being antagonistic to all things Turkish. For its part, Ankara should reach out to Iraq’s Kurds (Turkey’s relatives, after all) and assure them that its aim is not to crush Kurdish rights but to help Iraq as a whole. All sides have much to gain. Now, it’s up to each of them to play their part.
Asla Aydintasbas, a New York-based writer for the Turkish newspaper Sabah, is an adjunct fellow at the Western Policy Cetner in Washington.