Unable To Find WMD, U.S. Arms Team To Leave Iraq

Leaders of Task Force 75’s diverse staff – biologists, chemists, arms treaty enforcers, nuclear operators, computer and document experts, and special forces troops – arrived with high hopes of early success. They said they expected to find what Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described at the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5 – hundreds of tons of biological and chemical agents, missiles and rockets to deliver the agents, and evidence of an ongoing program to build a nuclear bomb.

Scores of fruitless missions broke that confidence, many task force members said in interviews.

Army Col. Richard McPhee, who will close down the task force next month, said he took seriously U.S. intelligence warnings on the eve of war that Hussein had given "release authority" to subordinates in command of chemical weapons. "We didn’t have all these people in [protective] suits" for nothing, he said. But if Iraq thought of using such weapons, "there had to have been something to use. And we haven’t found it. . . . Books will be written on that in the intelligence community for a long time."

Army Col. Robert Smith, who leads the site assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said task force leaders no longer "think we’re going to find chemical rounds sitting next to a gun." He added, "That’s what we came here for, but we’re past that."

U.S. Central Command began the invasion with a list of 19 top weapons sites. Only two remain to be searched. Another list enumerated 68 top "non-WMD sites," without known links to special weapons but judged to have the potential to offer clues. Of those, the tally at midweek showed 45 surveyed without success.

Task Force 75’s experience, and its impending dissolution after seven weeks in action, square poorly with assertions in Washington that the search has barely begun.

In his declaration of victory aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, President Bush said, "We’ve begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons, and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated."

Stephen A. Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, told reporters at the Pentagon Wednesday, May 7, that U.S. forces had surveyed only 70 of the roughly 600 potential weapons facilities on the "integrated master site list" prepared by U.S. intelligence agencies before the war.

However, on the front lines of the search, the focus is on a smaller number of high-priority sites, and the results are uniformly disappointing, participants told the Post.

"Why are we doing any planned targets?" Army Chief Warrant Officer Richard L. Gonzales, leader of Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha, said in disgust to a colleague during last Sunday’s nightly report of weapons sites and survey results. "Answer me that. We know they’re empty."

Survey teams have combed laboratories and munitions plants, bunkers and distilleries, bakeries and vaccine factories, file cabinets and holes in the ground where tipsters advised them to dig. Most of the assignments came with classified "target folders" describing U.S. intelligence leads. Others, known as the "ad hocs," came to the task force’s attention by way of plausible human sources on the ground.

The hunt will continue under a new Iraq Survey Group, which the Bush administration has said is a larger team. But the organizers are drawing down their weapons staffs for lack of work, and adding expertise for other missions.

Interviews and documents describing the transition from Task Force 75 to the new group show that site survey teams, the advance scouts of the arms search, will reduce from six to two their complement of experts in missile technology and biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

A little-known nuclear special operations group from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, called the Direct Support Team, has already sent home a third of its original complement, and plans to cut the remaining team by half.

"We thought we would be much more gainfully employed, or intensively employed, than we were," said Navy Cmdr. David Beckett, who directs special nuclear programs for the team.

During the invasion, launched on March 20 allegedly to eliminate the risk of Iraq’s arsenal of banned weapons, U.S. commanders kept repeating that Saddam Hussein would be keeping “the treasure” close to his heart (that is in Baghdad). The Iraqi capital fell, virtually without a fight, on April 9, and the alleged weapons of mass destruction were never used.

Since then, U.S. officials – topped by Bush – have insisted that finding the Iraqi banned weapons was just a matter of time.

State-of-the-art biological and chemical labs, shrunk to fit standard cargo containers, came equipped with enough supplies to run thousands of tests using DNA fingerprinting and mass spectrometry.

They have been called upon no more than a few dozen times, none with a confirmed hit. The labs’ director, who asked not to be identified, said some of his scientists were also going home.

Even the sharpest skeptics do not rule out that the hunt may eventually find evidence of banned weapons. The most significant unknown is what U.S. interrogators are learning from senior Iraqi scientists, military industrial managers and Iraqi government leaders now in custody.

If the non conventional arms exist, some of them ought to know. Publicly, the Bush administration has declined to discuss what the captured Iraqis are saying. In private, U.S. officials provide conflicting reports, with some hinting at important disclosures.

Cambone also said U.S. forces have seized "troves of documents" and are "surveying them, triaging them" for clues.

At former presidential palaces in the Baghdad area , where Task Force 75 will soon hand control to the Iraq Study Group, leaders and team members refer to the covert operators as "secret squirrels." If they are making important progress, it has not led to "actionable" targets, according to McPhee and other task force members.

McPhee, an artillery brigade commander from Oklahoma who was assigned to the task force five months ago, reflected on the weapons hunt as the sun set outside his improvised sleeping quarters, a cot and mosquito net set down in the wreckage of a marble palace annex. He smoked a cigar, but without the peace of mind he said the evening ritual usually brings.

"My unit has not found chemical weapons," he said. "That’s a fact. And I’m 47 years old, having a birthday in one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces on a lake in the middle of Baghdad. It’s surreal. The whole thing is surreal.

"Am I convinced that what we did in this fight was viable? I tell you from the bottom of my heart: We stopped Saddam Hussein in his WMD programs," he said, using the abbreviation for weapons of mass destruction. "Do I know where they are? I wish I did . . . but we will find them. Or not. I don’t know. I’m being honest here."

"We came to bear country, we came loaded for bear and we found out the bear wasn’t here," said a Defense Intelligence Agency officer in Baghdad who asked not to be identified by name. "The indications and warnings were there. The assessments were solid."

"Okay, that paradigm didn’t exist," he added. "The question before was, where are Saddam Hussein’s chemical and biological weapons? What is the question now? That is what we are trying to sort out."

"I don’t think we’ll find anything," said Army Capt. Tom Baird, one of two deputy operations officers under McPhee. "What I see is a lot of stuff destroyed." The Defense Intelligence Agency officer, describing a "sort of a lull period" in the search, said that whatever may have been at the target sites is now "dispersed to the wind."

All last week, McPhee drilled his staff on speeding the transition. The Iraq Survey Group should have all the help it needs, he said, to take control of the hunt. He is determined, subordinates said, to set the stage for success after he departs.

And he does not want to leave his soldiers behind if their successors can be trained in time.

"I see them as Aladdin’s carpet," McPhee told his staff. "Ticket home."