Turkish Foreign Policy in 2003

Discussions on waging a war against Iraq began in the US after attacks of September 11 and they gained a new dimension after the declaration of Bush government of its determination to dethrone Saddam late 2002 and early 2003. The fact that Washington neither took the opinions of other members of the United Nations Security Council into consideration nor gave any attention to the concerns of its allies in the EU left Turkey with a dilemma. On the one hand, there was the US which has been perceived by Turkey as a "strategic ally" for decades and considered as giving Turkey both political and economic support, which is also the only remaining superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there was the EU to which Turkey has been trying to become a full member with all its energy and also the Iraqi public that was supposed not to forget Turkey’s possible support for US military operation for centuries…

If one perceives the events in this framework, the following dilemmas can be perceived: If Turkey had let the US soldiers pass through Turkish territory, friendly relations between Ankara and Washington would have continued and present status of Ankara in international politics would have been strengthened. However, this may have caused great reaction especially in Germany and France that are the leading countries in te EU, both at the official and public level. Turkey may also have been sent back from the door of the European club for this reason.

Realists emphasizing military and political power and rational behavior in international relations and neorealists stressing upon relative power position of the countries in the international system would have expected that Turkey would prefer the first choice and support the US in the war. But, Turkish decision-makers, to a certain extent influenced by the opposition of majority of Turkish public to the war, did not approve passage of US soldiers and chose the second option.

It could be expected that realists and neorealists would claim that their opinions have been proved right in the end by the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in October allowing Turkish soldiers to be sent to Iraq. This decision seemed to be taken to a great extent because of the US pressure. Finally, international balance of power became effective and Turkey came to act the way US wished. Nevertheless, why it happened so late and why Turkey did dare to oppose Washington’s policies in the first stages are important questions that need to be further analyzed.

Another interesting point is how much role was played by the relations with the EU and Turkey’s target of full membership in this decision. Could the EU accession reforms carried out by the Turkish government strengthen "European identity" dimension of the Turkish foreign policy? Could this identity begin to play a greater role in determining national interests? Or could this identity become a part of the national interest?

These research questions must be further dealt with, however these questions can also be rejected by arguing that EU member states failed to come up with a unified policy during the Iraqi war. Joint letter written by some member and candidate countries that were supporting the US-led war led to a great crisis within the EU. Nevertheless, since France and Germany, leading countries of the Union, were against the war and since solution of the disputes without resorting to military means has been one of the founding principles of the EU, it can still be analysed whether full-membership perspective affected Ankara’s decisions.

Antoher important issue that has been widely discussed in Turkey last year has been Cyprus. Although Cyprus has been an important foreign policy problem in Ankara since mid-1950s, both because of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s plan and the fact that deadline for Southern Cyprus is coming nearer, the issue has always been on the agenda in 2003. Moreover, the year 2003 witnessed loss of consensus on Cyprus issue among foreign policy decision-makers in Turkey.

The insistence of AKP (Justice and Development Party) government on finding a solution on the basis of Annan Plan on the one hand, and the fact Rauf Denktas, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and an important part of the Turkish bureaucracy seems to be content with the status quo on the other, has led to problems both in domestic and foreign policy. While Denktas has been trying to cooperate with officials in Turkey defending similar views, AKP government has rather been following policies closer to the EU line. The attitude of the Turkish government resulted in establishment of a transnational alliance between itself and the Union.

If a solution is not found to the Cyprus dispute until 1 May 2004 in which the Southern Cyprus will become a full member, this will result in failure of not only parties to the Cyprus problem, but also of the EU. In this case, the Union would be a party to a conflict among Turkey, Greece, TRNC and Southern Cyprus and could not have played the role of catalysis in finding a solution. This would cause new quarrels among member countries and mean a new blow for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Although the EU indirectly sets the Cyprus problem as a barrier to the Turkey’s membership perspective, I argue that Cyprus does not have a vital role to play in decision of the EU whether to take Turkey in or not. If the Cyprus issue is not solved, and Turkey is not given a date for starting negotiations, it is very likely that Cyprus will be shown as an excuse. But Ankara’s membership mainly depends on other factors. Since May 2004 EU will have 25 members with the addition of 10 new countries and realize that its present structures are not complying with the new situation, thus have to reconsider both its institutions and policies.

The situation will be more complicated with the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. EU will face new problems, especially in the economic realm. It is still unknown what kind of structure EU will have in the future. The number of EU members will be twice more in comparison to today. Therefore, unless the EU determines features of its institutions in the medium- to long-term, it will be reluctant to let Turkey join the club. However, history repeats itself in Turkey: As Turkish politicians tried to show Customs Union as full membership to the Turkish public in recent years, now they attempt to present the date of starting negotions as a signal of Turkey’s becoming a member in the near-term.

Based on the evaluations above, is it possible to estimate possible course of Turkish foreign policy in 2004? At least the following can be stated: Since establishment of stability in Iraq does not seem possible in the immediate future, Ankara has to follow develepments in the neighboring country closely. Moreover, the decision to be taken on the Cyprus issue by Turkey and TRNC will have reflections in both domestic politics and relations with Greece. However, it is not possible to say yet whether the Cyprus issue will be solved or not. On the other hand, the EU’s decision about Turkey in December will have influence on Turkish-EU relations in the coming years.