Turkey’s Iraqi dilemma
Bulent Aras
PART -II-
The relations between the U.S. and Turkey have never been free from problems, but Ankara never had the privilege of being at odds with American interests in the Middle East. For example, during the Jupiter missile crisis, the Turkish establishment recognized how a superpower can ignore the vital interests of a small ally. Turkey’s first serious encounter with the dominant elements of the post-Cold War order was a similar experience since NATO did not guarantee joint action in case of an Iraqi attack on Turkish territories. However, even under this condition, Turkey extended the utmost assistance to the U.S.-led coalition forces against Iraq. In order to understand this dependency relationship, one should add that 80 percent of the arms in Turkey are of U.S. origin.
In more specific terms, Turkish foreign policy makers believe that they have enough evidence to support their negative perceptions. They have approached the Washington process with suspicion that brought the two powerful Kurdish leaders together with the U.S. secretary of state and left Turks outside. Turkish policy makers, however, were included in the preceding processes of Dublin and Ankara. Turkish policy makers have also kept their eyes on the developments after the invitation of Kurdish opposition groups without Turcomans to Washington in August 2002. In this process, Ankara had no formal relationship with Iraqi opposition groups and worried about the U.S. attitude of keeping Ankara distant from its designs toward Iraq.
There is a constant danger of mass Kurdish migration to Turkey in the period following the Gulf crisis. The Kurds that fled to Turkey in the aftermath of the Gulf War were sent back shortly afterwards. In order to control the situation in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was established and this force was limited and changed to Operation Northern Watch (ONC) in 1997. There is distrust of these forces in Turkey and their existence (and extension of their stay) has always been a hot issue in Turkish politics.
There are allegations against the OPC/ONC, which range from helping wounded militants of the PKK to providing logistic support to a future Kurdish state in Iraq. Ankara restricted the entrance of Western civil societal organizations to this region to prevent their fifth column activities and potential harm to the Kurdish question. From the Turkish perspective, the existence of OPC/ONC meant providing security to the Kurdish region and preventing Saddam from intervening in northern Iraq.
The U.S. administration adapted a more decisive and ideological policy toward the Middle East in the aftermath of September 11. This policy line from many respects is in conflict with international law and implies a problematic content for the balance of the Middle East. The U.S. administration spent the second half of 2002 persuading the world community that Saddam continues to produce weapons of mass destruction and has links with the al-Qaeda network. There is no strong evidence and these allegations are only leading to the loss of American credibility.
The Bush administration’s insistence for a military offensive without clear evidence about the allegations fosters the idea that the U.S. uses September 11 as a pretext to eliminate any serious threats to its interests. The U.S. policy bears a direct impact on domestic politics of the Middle Eastern states. Turkish society opposes an attack on Iraq and this objection puts the policy makers in a difficult position. In addition, a number of prominent Turkish politicians, like leftist Bulent Ecevit and Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, who have a very critical stance against the current U.S policy, would not raise their voices due to the dominant U.S position in the Middle East and Turkey’s economic and military over-dependence on the U.S.
The cost of sanctions
Turkish policy during the Gulf crisis and U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq has been critical subjects for the Turkish public and has left an unpleasant memory. A large segment of Turkish society have expressed their discomfort to these developments. Trade between Turkey and Iraq has almost finished and, according to popular argument, Turkey lost $50-60 billion after the sanctions. The president of Ankara’s chamber of commerce pointed out that public discontent is this way:
Turkey lost $50-60 billion in trade with Iraq due to the Gulf war. Besides political problems, the economies of southern and southeastern Turkey are severely influenced and regional income balances were disrupted. If one considers the other negative influences on the balance of trade, the U.S. pursues the sanctions against Turkey, not Iraq.
Turkish foreign policy makers use such a discourse in their international agenda and argue that the cost of a new Iraqi war on Turkey would not be less than the earlier one. The U.N. resolution that closed the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline in August 1990 was revised after an agreement between the U.N. and Iraq, and oil transfer was resumed for six months in December 1996. The U.N. exempted the Kurdish areas from economic sanctions. Turkish attempts to look for compensation did not go anywhere and sometimes faced opposition, the cost of sanctions is exaggerated in Turkey. The counter discourse that what would be the cost if the sanctions would not be imposed is an important barrier for Turks’ search for compensation.
There is state-society contradiction in terms of Turkey’s actual policies that means pursuing a different policy than what has been demanded at the societal level. The U.S. administration does not pay enough attention to potential impact of the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. soldiers to Turkish and Muslim societies. One should remember that the U.S. military existence in Saudi Arabia triggered a series of events that lead to September 11. In this sense, an American invasion of Baghdad would have an enormous impact on the political consciousness of contemporary Muslim societies. The current situation of this city reflects the overall condition of Islamic civilization today. As Gokhan Bacik aptly argued:
The invasion of Baghdad by American soldiers, one of the centers that produced Islamic civilization, will symbolically constitute the lowest point in recession of Islamic civilization. The idea of Baghdad’s invasion is a very critical issue and Turkey is in a position that has to be away from these kinds of developments as much as possible. Any attempt that will facilitate Iraq’s invasion by foreign forces may result in Turkey being remembered negatively.
This possible alienation in foreign policy is also valid for domestic politics. Turkey’s Iraqi policy may turn into a battleground of a number of different identities. The mentioned alienation is likely to widen the gap between the societal norms and state elites and to raise the tension between state and society. In economic terms, Turkey’s southeastern region witnesses almost the same problems that Iraqi people face and the increasing consciousness that these economic problems are due to U.N. sanctions created a positive empathy with Iraqi people in Turkish society in addition to the discussed symbolic context.
Analysis of Turkish dilemma in Iraqi question
Turkey prefers an Iraq that has a central government and keeps its territorial unity. Ankara also considers this preference as the best option for its (and all others’) security concerns. In a broader sense, Ankara favors to solve the other problematic dimensions of the Iraqi question within the scheme of the U.N. According to Turkey’s ruling elite, this is the best formula to solve the question and it cannot foresee a change in international society towards establishing a federation in Iraq.
Interestingly, the same policy makers, who are insistent on keeping Iraqi territorial unity, demand for a right of just representation for the Turkmens. If there is no federal solution on the agenda, how can one talk about the issue of Turkmen rights and representation? Would it not be intervening in internal affairs of another country that Ankara is so sensitive about? Ankara also continuously threatens Kurds to not have designs for having control of Kirkuk and Mosul. There is nothing wrong about the argument that these cities should belong to all Iraqi people. However, for the time being, it does not seem possible to provide this without a federal solution.
The new Turkish republic had a defensive character and it would not be wrong to argue that this character is inherited from the Ottoman experience of preserving the country in the last three centuries of the empire. Ataturk’s (the founder of modern Turkey) principle of "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" has long been a dominant rallying cry, and foreign policy makers have conducted foreign policies in an introverted and reluctant manner. The paranoia, or Sevres Syndrome, which has a long history among Turkish people, is based on the notion that the country is surrounded by enemies and constantly faces the danger of breakup or partition. This distinctively Turkish view of the world still plays a vital role in shaping the minds of nationalist foreign policy makers. This explanation reminds us of Jutta Weldes’ argument that: "insecurity is itself the product of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted — they can all be seen as resting on the assumption that identity and insecurity are produced in a mutually constitutive process."
The Ottoman Empire gradually lost its territories and, for a long time, all their conduct with foreign powers meant loss of territory or granting concessions to them. This particular historical memory had a deep impact on Turkish culture of security and created an oversensitive but sure perception about the existence of foreign designs to divide Turkey. This perception is so influential in the ruling elite’s security concerns that any potential political and geographical change in Turkey’s near environs would be interpreted as the steps to divide and dissolve Turkey. The panic atmosphere considering the potential American attacks on Iraq is a good example in this sense. One can better understand Turkey’s relief in the Cold War period if one considers the tight balances and unchanging and non-dynamic nature of regional policy during that period. An overtly stable environment is the best solution for those who witnessed the change as the loss of power and territory in their memories
The utopian idealism, an egocentric illusion and ideological perception of foreign policy prevent the ruling elite from adapting themselves for change and putting new strategies vis-a-vis the new conditions. This lack of strategy for the developments tried to be solved through continuously changing positions. However, this only means putting a number of passive measures on trial and does not yield any concrete result. Whatever their position is, Turkish foreign policy makers only try to preserve what already exists, i.e., the Cyprus question and northern Iraqi policy. Having such a background in the Turkish culture of security, Turkish foreign policy makers fail to understand, for example, Mesud Barzani’s declaration that Ankara will be faced with a Kurdish intifada if the Turkish military enters into northern Iraq. The Turkish policy makers’ lack of understanding of the problem in its wider context also encourages Barzani to warn Ankara to solve the problems of its own Kurdish population.
From a different perspective, this is a domestic problem. It is also related to Ankara’s choice in which part of the world it wants to take place. The meaningful alternative is to diminish the potential ethnic problems to a minimum degree within the context of European Union (EU) membership. Then there will be no more serious consideration about foreign manipulation and provocation. In addition, the problem of the status of Kurds in northern Iraq may cease to be a security problem. As two prominent Turkish security experts argued:
"For the Turks, the only way to forestall Kurdish statehood may be to place their own armed forces on the scene so that they are directly involved in the postwar transition period." This position does not fit into regional realities and represents a short term policy line, which is very likely to change depending on the moves of other actors. The egocentric illusion of the Turkish establishment, which thinks that they can survive without adjusting their policies in accordance with the world scale changes, resulted in the formulation of problematic foreign policy behaviors. It is strange that they think they are doing right on a number of issues that in all else are wrong. The same illusion also misled them to think they can change or redirect world scale issues through home made initiatives. The Iraqi question is now a dilemma for Turkey, and the policies that aim to satisfy Turkish security concerns thwarted the emergence of a more problematic situation in Iraq.
Conclusion
For a long time, Turkish foreign policy was conducted without considering the anarchic order of the international system and structural requirements of regional policy. The historical-cultural tie between Turkey and the Middle East that goes back to the early sixteenth century further complicates the situation. The official establishment’s identity determines the national interest and foreign policy behavior and this situation makes foreign policy hostage to the state elites’ world view and domestic political considerations. In this sense, when serious developments and changes occur in domestic policy or something incompatible with local balances happens, then foreign policy behavior sharpens and its ability to follow regional and international balances diminishes. Thus, it is not appropriate to employ realist measures to explain Turkish foreign policy behaviour. It has its own "rights and wrongs" and is heavily value-oriented. Namely, official identity defines the threats based on its own culture of security.
The Turkish policy toward Iraq is both the result and end of the dilemma discussed in this article. In addition, the Turkish attitude for cooperation with the U.S. at the heights of the debates for a possible operation in Iraq also reflects the same dilemma. Ankara closely follows the developments and tries very hard to express its reservations and reluctance through indirect ways; it declares it will support the American operation if it sees a high degree of decisiveness. Turkish foreign policy makers keep their suspicion of Kurds’ (and their international allies’) desire of independence and former prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, continuously warned that such a development would be a casus belli. Another warning is related to Kurdish designs over Kirkuk, and Ankara declared that it would react if Kurds attempt to have control of this area. While having such an aggressive attitude and hawkish policy line, Ankara also points out problems of American action in Iraq in terms of international law and lack of consensus among the members of the U.N. Security Council.
Considering the diverse attitude toward the Iraqi question, the Turkish people’s choices in domestic politics and international relations are likely to change the current policies. This will also be determined by the Turkish establishment’s determined will to resist the societal demands. The tension between state and society would be reflected in foreign policy issues. The majority of Turkish people demand EU membership and want to solve domestic and regional problems within the structural and legal framework of the EU. The idea of a fortress Turkey and a national security state does not fit into the realities of international politics as well as political and societal developments in Turkey. A new understanding that will emphasize societal demands and appropriating global norms and principles may put an end to similar dilemmas in foreign policy. This will not only serve for Turkish interests, but for regional peace and stability as well.
