Turkey’s Arab gambit

Yet despite the strategic Turkish-Israeli partnership, Amman remained on friendly terms with Ankara. In fact, Jordan continued taking part in joint naval maneuvers with the Turkish, US, and Israeli navies in the Mediterranean for many years, which made it seem for a time that the Jordanians were about to join a tripartite pact with Israel and Turkey under American tutelage. This irritated the Jordanian government, prompting it to deny that any political intentions lay behind its taking part in these “routine” maneuvers.
Another objective behind Gul’s Arab tour was to express Turkish goodwill vis-a-vis the Arab world by offering to work together with Arab countries on averting an American war on Iraq. Turkey knows that a new war on Iraq would cause it immense economic damage. The $5 billion in aid promised by the United States would do nothing to compensate Turkey from the losses it expects to incur if the Americans went ahead with their war plans. Turkey ­ like Jordan ­ would suffer immensely due to the stoppage of Iraqi oil exports.
In fact, Jordan would suffer even more because of its extensive economic and commercial ties with Iraq ­ valued at more than 350 million Jordanian dinars ($439 million). More importantly, Jordan relies on cheap Iraqi oil to meet its energy needs. Some of this oil is given away free, while the rest is sold to the Jordanians at a price significantly lower than the going world rate. Uncompensated loss of this source of cheap energy would seriously hurt the Jordanian economy.
However, Turkey does not enjoy full freedom of political action. While it certainly can move quite easily to improve its relations with influential Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, even to the degree of being able to make its relations with the Arab world take precedence over its ties with Israel, these political adjustments would not necessarily imply similar shifts in the military and economic fields.
Turkey has no strategic ties with the Arab world to rival those it enjoys with Israel. The Turkish-Israeli relationship was built up over decades under American stewardship. In the field of military cooperation, the Israelis have been modernizing the Turkish Air Force in a deal brokered by the United States at the expense of American firms. The Israelis have also undertaken to modernize and train parts of the Turkish Army. And with the exception of Jordan ­ which was suspected of being part of the Turkish-Israeli alliance ­ Turkey did not establish strong relations with any Arab country, save for limited trade exchanges.
The crises between Turkey and neighboring Syria and Iraq over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers may have abated, but that has not allayed Arab suspicions of Ankara’s economic, military and hydrologic policies.
All of which means that any Turkish attempt to rearrange the country’s priorities would inevitably collide with its stable and strong relationship with Israel ­ as well as with the lack of strong foundations of cooperation with its Arab neighbors.
Moreover, Turkey’s drive to improve relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds is restricted by a number of basic facts ­ chief among which is that of Turkey’s membership in NATO.
NATO membership imposes on Turkey certain obligations that it has to fulfill. For example, the Turks are obliged to allow the US to use the air bases at Incirlik and Diyarbakir for NATO or American military operations. These bases were used in the 1991 Gulf War to launch air raids on Iraq. They were also used in NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and might well be used again in the new war on Iraq. The Turks are also required to allow the Americans to use their territory to move ground troops into northern Iraq.
NATO membership ­ as well as alliance with Israel ­ compels Turkey to take part in intelligence-gathering activities in neighboring countries, both within the framework of the “war on terror” and outside it. Sophisticated surveillance stations have been built on Turkish soil in order to monitor movements between Russia and Iran, and to spy on nuclear cooperation between the two countries. These stations also monitor military and economic activities in Central Asia in order to enhance Turkey’s role in these countries and to obstruct Iranian Shiite infiltration in the region.
In addition to presenting the secular and democratic Turkish example as a model to be emulated by the republics of Central Asia, the Turks also aim to compete with Iran and Russia for giant projects to transport Caspian oil through their territory to export terminals on the Mediterranean.
Turkey’s failure so far to be accepted as a member of the European Union caused it to rely on US pressure on the EU.
Despite being a Muslim nation, Turkey has never cultivated close ties with other countries of the Muslim world. Due to its secular nature, and its geographic location between Europe and Asia, Turkey has always seen itself as part of Europe ­ which has plunged the country into a deep identity crisis.
The fact that the Islamist AKP has been forced to stress the secular nature of the Turkish state proved that it is impossible for an Islamist party to rule the country in the presence of the immense influence wielded by the army that sees itself as the guardian of secularism. Any attempt to limit the influence enjoyed by the army generals would inevitably lead to the AKP being dissolved under the pretext of violating the constitution, which enshrines the secular nature of the Turkish state.
Attempts by any Turkish ruling party to improve ties with the Arab world would inevitable collide with the conflicting interests of both sides ­ at the forefront of which are the conflicting interests of Turkey and Iraq, and Turkish ambitions to seize the northern Iraqi oil fields.
Such attempts would also collide with the fact that while existing relations between Turkey and the Arab world are fragile, those with Israel are strong and stable.