Turkey’s AKP on Trial
One front is in Europe where possible Turkish membership is deemed to be either difficult, given Turkey’s present standards, or blatantly detrimental to the notion of "Europeanism" which is construed as a cultural entity whereby Islam and the "east" is the other. If the other is incorporated then Europeanness will loose its meaning and identity. The hidden hierarchical perception of the world and superiority of Western culture over the others is evident in this argument. Conservative and nationalist Turks share the same opinion with their conservative and right wing European counterparts concerning the uniqueness of their respective cultures. The two should remain apart and not intermingle. However, most Turks have no problem in accepting Western Civilization as the ultimate target to catch up with the contemporary standards of democracy and affluence.
For them it was Ataturk’s directive and is practically the right thing to do in order to be a dynamic, democratic and prosperous country. We frequently come across articles and statements for or against Turkey’s membership to the Union, analyzing the matter from a cost-benefit perspective rather than from a civilization perspective. Civilizations expand and incorporate. If members of a civilization refuse to share their values, ideals and institutions with others, can they be deemed to be civilized or just members of an interest group? If the latter is true that means they thrive on the "others" and the others who are denied of the advantages of a civilization or simply feel exploited and excluded may react in ways that may be detrimental to that civilization.
On the other front, the leadership of the AKP that will guide Turkey through a long and arduous journey is debated. While there were dwindling doubts regarding the AKP leadership in managing the colossal transformation that lay ahead, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s insistence in passing the adultery law raised serious doubts about the party’s leadership role and true mentality.
What kind of a party is AKP? Can it lead Turkey in this historical moment where major structural changes are impending? First of all AKP is the party of the "other Turks" driven by tradition rather than modern values, not born in major towns but born and raised either in rural or small-town Turkey and later migrated to the modest districts of metropolitan cities. They grew up under the heavy influence of tradition at the core of which religion lies. During their socialization patriarchalism, familialism and communalism they have contained their individualism never allowing them to act on their own discretion and exercise personal will in the management of their own affairs. That is why they joined sects, religious-nationalist organizations and later the youth branches of the religious political parties very early on in their lives. They quickly grasped the power of ideology and organization, hence the need to differentiate between state and society in order to be free. Religion (or religiosity as a cohesive) ideology and communalism are the basic qualities of a large section of the AKP constituency. The rest comes from two sources: one is the supporters of other right wing parties who have lost hope in the electoral success of their own parties, the other is the disillusioned protest voters ranging from right to left.
Three phenomenons helped the AKP appear on the political stage in spite of its incubation in the Welfare Party tradition that had adopted an unequivocal religious vocation. These are as follows:
1) Visible decline of growing discontent with the religious regime in Iran.
2) Debilitating pressure by the secular forces backed up by the army that pushed the Refah Party led coalition government out of power in 1997.
3) Decision of the European Court of Human Rights which vindicated the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision to ban Refah Party on the grounds of anti-secular policies. Those who drew lessons out of these phenomenons felt cornered in the Refah party and founded AK Party. A differentiation between the reactionaries who resisted change and those conservatives who perceived change and wanted a gradual adaptation took place in the formation of Saadet Party and AK Party. While the first polled 4 percent, the other emerged victorious polling ten times more in the latest national elections that took place two years ago.
Since its ascendance to power the AKP walked a fine line from traditionalism to modernity on the one hand and the liberalization of Islam on the other. From the onset their role as the "transformer" was more expedient than voluntary. They wanted freedom for themselves and they expressed freedom as exercising their religious duties freely and rid themselves of official pressures. But with the "post modern coup" that pushed the Refah government out of power, the founders of the AK Party grasped that they had to defend all freedoms in order to safeguard religious freedom. They also understood that in order to marginalize official pressures on them, they had to limit the privileges of bureaucracy and the dominant role of the state over society. As a result, the party who was expected and accused of adopting shariah law accepted the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights over the decisions of the domestic High Court of Appeals.
In a matter of two years the reference of the Islamic movement in Turkey ceased to be the Koran and the sunna, it became democracy and individual volition. Traditionalism and authoritarianism gave way to human rights and liberal ideals. Liberalization of state policies led to the acknowledgement of multiculturalism that in turn led to minority rights. This is a revolution in it own right. The statist tradition in republican Turkey neither acknowledged minorities nor affords them rights other than the Christian minorities protected by the Lausanne Treaty. Considering that the president of the Religious Affairs Directorate Professor Bardakoglu recently said that the "Koran is historical," meaning it may and must be reinterpreted according to our time, and a three-day human rights international symposium was financed by the government last week, means things are rapidly changing in Turkey.
What makes Turkey different from the rest of Muslim countries? Is it the AKP’s leadership only? No, it is the social change generated by the market economy, its educated elite class who have left its modernizing imprint on the society, dynamic urbanization, migratory movements to and from different parts of the world (especially Europe), a century of electoral parliamentary tradition and women’s active participation in public life, albeit in urban centers. The AKP seized on this historical capital and opened the door for the "other Turks" who were neither privileged nor had the chance for upward mobility or public visibility. However, they too anted to be a part of the establishment and share the advantages of modern life, which they were devoid of.
AKP provided them the political vehicle they needed. In this sense the AKP brought more people to the center and widened the base of socio-political participation. In short, AKPs success is not in voicing the reactionaries but acting as a democratic instrument that does protect individual freedoms including those who are religious and seek representation in the public sphere with this quality. If the AKP acquires an authoritarian stance, then it will loose both the support of the liberals and conservatives who want protection from official pressures as well as state support in their daily activities.
So far the AKP have managed to hold together the liberals and conservatives under its roof because the conservatives provided the popular support and the liberals provided guidance. Such a relatively progressive coalition is also an incentive for the creation of a contemporary leftist or social democratic party/center that does not rely on state powers to move the country ahead.
What if the AKP fails and its leader(s) fail as in the "adultery debate." The liberal-conservative coalition collapses and Turkey looses direction. Fringe forces compete and the bureaucracy wins over the reactionaries that want sins to be penalized by law. Once again Turkey begins to be guided by "national security" principles rather than human rights and rule of law. Then those who insist that Turkey and Europe have two different, in fact opposing, cultures are vindicated. Who would benefit from this confrontation? Turks? Europeans? No doubt it will not be either democracy or a contemporary civilization.
