Turkey: Managing an unfriendly ally
U.S.-Turkish relations have been undergoing a steady erosion for years. Well-known problems in bilateral ties—particularly, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia and U.S. cooperation with the YPG, a Syrian Kurdish group linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), against the Islamic State group (IS)—linger seemingly unresolvable. Turkish resentment also simmers over U.S. judicial action against a Turkish state bank accused of circumventing Iran sanctions and over the United States’ long-time refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, the recently deceased religious leader who Ankara accused of masterminding a 2016 coup attempt. Meanwhile, Turkey continues to insist, ever more emphatically, on its pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy; its latest step in that direction is an application to join the BRICS bloc, along with a long-expressed interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—with Russia and China forming the core of both organizations.
Despite these difficulties, the U.S. executive branch still values U.S. relations with Turkey—and for good reasons: Turkey sits “at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent,” as the late Richard Holbrooke put it 30 years ago, and it has an increasingly strong military, the second largest in NATO. Moreover, its military power is buttressed by a growing Turkish military industry that now ranks 11th in the world in exports. A third factor, mentioned rarely but appreciated by policymakers, is Turkey’s identity as a major Muslim-majority nation. This proved particularly important as a source of legitimacy during the era of the “war on terrorism,” when Turkey participated in NATO’s Afghanistan operation, and would still matter in future NATO involvement in the Muslim world. With Turkey on board, the easy equation of the West with “the Christian world” is at least somewhat diluted.
Diminished expectations…
While still valuing Turkey’s geostrategic importance, the Biden administration’s response to ongoing bilateral problems has been to scale back expectations. In June last year, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told CNN’s Fareed Zakaria that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive relationship with them.”
Thus, current U.S. policy is to acknowledge Turkey’s more autonomous foreign-policy direction as well as U.S.-Turkish differences but focus on new areas of potential cooperation and avoid creating new problems. Preoccupied with the Turkish economy, the Turkish government seems to reciprocate this approach for now, not pressing hard on issues like U.S. support for the YPG.
This probably explains the Biden administration’s silence on Turkish human rights failings and on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s pro-Hamas, anti-Israeli, and anti-American rhetoric. Regarding Turkey’s circumvention of sanctions on Russia, Washington has only sanctioned some Turkish-based entities but hasn’t directly accused Ankara itself of sanction-busting. The United States has also sanctioned numerous Hamas financiers based in Turkey, but without blaming the Turkish government. Earlier this year, the United States even helped remove Turkey from the “gray list” of the Financial Action Task Force, the international consortium that monitors money laundering and terrorist financing.
…amid declining support for ties
This approach has been effective in slowing the downward spiral in bilateral relations—but it may not be durable. In the absence of a breakthrough on major bilateral problems, like the S-400s, the basis for relations will remain shaky—and unlikely to survive the next bilateral crisis, be it an aggressive action by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean or tough anti-Turkish legislation in the U.S. Congress.
Adding to the fragility of bilateral ties is the reality that U.S. domestic support for relations with Turkey is weaker than ever. For example, one of Turkey’s strongest pillars of support in days of yore, American Jewish community organizations, today is largely hostile, in response to Erdoğan’s unrelenting anti-Israel rhetoric and embrace of Hamas.
Similarly, the U.S. Congress, a troublesome realm for Turkey even in the best of times, became a much friendlier place for Ankara in the first decade of Erdoğan’s rule, when, rightly or wrongly, his Justice and Development Party was admired by many as an example of the salving effect of democracy on political Islam and a possible key to unlocking U.S. problems with Islamism worldwide. The size of a congressional caucus may only serve as a rough estimate of the importance of a given country in Washington, but it is still indicative. Begun in 2001, Congress’ Turkey Caucus steadily grew in size over several years. By the 114th Congress (2015-2016), its membership had grown to 160 members of Congress, making it the third-largest country-specific caucus, after India and Taiwan. Decline then set in for several reasons, not least the unprovoked attack by Erdoğan’s visiting security team on pro-Kurdish protestors at Sheridan Circle. Today, it is down to 81 members. It is no coincidence that the Armenian Genocide resolution, the prevention of which had long been Turkey’s top congressional priority, passed in 2019 during this period of decline.
Historically close military ties are under strain as well. Following the failed coup attempt in 2016, purges of the Turkish officer corps seemed to fall disproportionately on those who had established close relations with their U.S. counterparts, and relationship-building with the new cadres remains a work in progress. Perhaps more damaging has been the antagonism that has developed between the Turkish military and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) due to the latter’s close cooperation in northern Syria with the PKK-linked YPG. This antipathy reinforces earlier tensions that developed between the two militaries in the early days of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Turkey itself is in the “area of responsibility” (AOR) of the U.S. European Command, but, having occupied large swaths of northern Syria and northern Iraq in recent years, the Turkish military is also present in the AOR of CENTCOM, which covers the Middle East.
Today, decisionmakers within the Executive Branch—primarily, the State Department and the National Security Council—remain strong backers of U.S. relations with Turkey for the geostrategic reasons cited above. Outside calls for “divorce” are not shared by U.S. officials. But there is no enthusiasm for Erdoğan or Turkey either. The Turkish leader is seen more as a burden to be borne until a better day arrives in bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Washington has begun to hedge its geostrategic bets in the region, including, for example, by stepping up its military cooperation with Greece and developing military facilities there.
Recommendations
Turkey is a treaty ally, but not exactly a friend. It is unique among NATO allies in its interest in both developing relations with Russia and China and its outspoken support for Hamas. The United States needs to do its best to keep Turkey on the NATO reservation, but it also needs to prepare for the worst—that is, an actual break. Washington has every reason to support the Turkish economy while remaining firm in opposing Turkish purchases of Russian arms or any kind of security relationship between Ankara and Moscow. Washington should also warily approach Turkish requests for advanced U.S. arms and technology-sharing, unless it is confident that there is a clear overlap in Turkish and U.S. goals. In sum, the United States should cooperate with Turkey where possible, support its economy, and be cautious in assisting the growth of its military power.
That requires nuance. There is no perfect formula. The United States needs to carefully calibrate its economic and military support for Turkey. Restricting arms sales can have its own consequences. Withholding the sale of F-35 stealth fighters to Turkey, for example, could drive Turkey to purchase Russian or Chinese equipment, create a gap that is filled by European suppliers, or speed Turkey’s development of its own fighter jet, the Kaan, which is already well underway. At the end of the day, however, Turkey’s inventory is based on American equipment, and access to U.S. materiel should be an incentive for Turkey to modify its rhetoric and policies in a more US-friendly direction.
Of course, Washington should try to find a solution to the S-400 problem, but within the confines of U.S. law requiring Turkey to actually relinquish possession of the Russian-made air-defense system. If Turkey is willing to give up possession of its S-400 batteries, the United States should be willing to put the sale of Patriots, a defensive weapon, squarely back on the table. However, the United States should not sell F-35s to Erdoğan’s Turkey unless it is fully convinced the aircraft will be used in ways that accord with U.S. interests. (To be sure, the original rationale for withholding F-35s from Turkey was concern that its technology would be exposed to the Russian S-400s. Erdoğan’s more recent history of threats against Turkey’s neighbors, however, calls into question the very value to U.S. interests of such a sale, absent firm guarantees.)
Similarly, a situation with no clear-cut solution but one that is firmly part of the bilateral agenda is the matter of U.S. military support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); the SDF’s major element is the Kurdish YPG, which Turkey, with considerable justification, equates to the PKK. Given the complexities of the fight against IS in northeast Syria, Washington probably has little choice but to continue to work with the YPG, while pursuing deconfliction efforts between that militia and the Turkish military. The U.S. operation in northeast Syria has angered the Turkish government and public. It does, however, provide at least a certain degree of stability on Turkey’s border and saves Ankara from having to deal with the low-boil campaign against IS, as well as tens of thousands of imprisoned IS fighters and family members, in northeast Syria.
The prospect of a new Kurdish opening from the Turkish government, an idea recently touted by Erdoğan’s nationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, perhaps would provide grounds for a modus vivendi between Ankara and Syria’s Kurds and remove some of the strain in Turkish-U.S. ties, as Washington considers reducing its military footprint in the region.
In the absence of solutions to the S-400 and YPG issues, however, the new administration will have to strive to “agree to disagree” with Ankara, as the Biden administration has more or less successfully done for the past year-plus. In that case, however, these two issues will especially continue to corrode bilateral ties, governmentally and publicly.
Of course, there is more to the decades-long U.S.-Turkish relationship than military matters.
Turkey should be called out consistently for its human rights abuses, especially the unjustified imprisonments of Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş; its restrictions on freedom of speech, including those that limit legitimate Kurdish rights; and its absurd lese majeste laws that saw nearly 7,000 Turks hauled into court last year for “insulting” Erdogan.
There is always an argument in Washington against doing this: public proclamations on human rights rarely succeed in changing policies and sometimes create a backlash. The problem with remaining silent about human rights, however, is that it betrays core U.S. values and democrats inside Turkey, of which there are many.
Trade should be the new frontier in the relationship. U.S.-Turkish trade volume has increased 50% over the past five years, from about $20 billion to almost $40 billion, and the United States has become Turkey’s second-largest export market. Washington should encourage this trend, as it helps anchor Turkey to the West. Likewise, the United States should be as accommodating as possible regarding tariffs on Turkish goods. In a similar vein, Washington should encourage Turkey to pursue the World Bank’s recommendations to strive to increase its presence in global supply chains. (To accomplish this, the World Bank’s 2022 report urges, Turkey must “improve market access globally and deepen economic integration with major partners such the EU, especially by reducing barriers to trade in services.”) Whatever the United States’ difficulties with Turkey, Turkey is preferable to China as a link in global supply chains.
And finally, Washington should seek to maintain regular communication with Erdoğan, notwithstanding the challenges there. The Turkish leader is a complex personality: part ideologue, part pragmatist—straddling between the personal and strategic. President Joe Biden was correct to give him the cold shoulder for the first part of his administration, but that may have dragged on too long. Erdoğan clearly resented not having any access to the U.S. president. It’s easier to keep him inside the tent when there is a personal relationship at the highest level.
Turkey, of course, is more than Erdoğan. He and his party could be gone by 2028, replaced by the secularist and more Western-oriented opposition. Washington should not alienate potential friends, but it must also deal with the realities of today.
