The Feb. 13 document

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after meeting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Davos and the U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington, had announced that he was accepting Annan’s preconditions outlined in the 148th paragraph of the U.N. Security Council resolution 1475.

As a result, Annan sent all sides an invitation letter on Feb. 4. The government said the PM had asked to discuss the objections to the plan agreed in the National Security Council (MGK) and criticized it not being raised in the letter. However, the invitation letter cited the PM asking to discuss a few alterations that did not contravene the plan’s fundamentals and in line with Annan’s preconditions. Moreover, the letter said that if the sides accepted the invitation and came to New York, it meant they accepted Annan’s preconditions.

In response, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) delegation headed by President Rauf Denktas, from the start of the meeting, tried to alter Annan’s preconditions. He prevented most of the preconditions accepted by PM Erdogan from appearing in the Feb. 13 document.

Let’s ignore the fact that the document, by accepting the Greek Cypriot demands for the May 1 deadline for an agreement and the discussions to deal with the entire plan, including federal laws and cooperation agreements, has put the timetable in jeopardy.

The acceptance of the negotiations to take up all our objections about the Annan plan is the most important alteration in Annan’s preconditions. Moreover, these objections are not limited to those that do not affect the plan’s fundamentals. As a result, half of the preconditions are eliminated immediately.

How is this done? By citing that the negotiations until Feb. 22 would be held under "the good will auspices" of Annan. According to resolution 1250 that defines the U.N. Secretary-General Annan’s "good will mission," all issues will be discussed without any preconditions.

Another alteration in favor of the Turkish side is the issues not agreed during the initial negotiations, being re-negotiated by the addition of the two guarantor countries, Greece and Turkey, under the chairmanship of Annan between March 22 and 29. As a result, Greece, for the first time, agrees to take up its responsibilities. Turkish Cypriots get the same treatment as their Greek counterparts and guarantor countries and the U.N. secretary-general are also included in the process.

Some say, "Annan, by having the right to put the finishing touches on the plan, has still not altered his March 10-11, 2003 stance." As I said before, this erroneous stance by Annan caused us to lose precious time. This was not understood, especially by our media. However, the Feb. 13 document changes this situation. Now, Annan cannot fill in any part of the plan without discussing it or even agreeing with the two guarantor countries. If Greece and Turkey think their objections were ignored, they might not agree to the document being put to referenda.

How? In the seventh paragraph of Annan’s invitation, dated Feb 4, it is said that the guarantor countries, in a "statement" (Annan plan page 3) they would sign on April 10, would agree to the document being put to referenda. In other words, the guarantor countries have the last say, not Annan.

Mr. Denktas, naturally, wanted the document that would be put to referenda, to be approved by the sides on Cyprus. The Feb. 13 document is not too clear in this respect. Under these conditions, Mr. Denktas and Greek Cypriot Tasos Papadopulos will not be responsible for the final document, while the guarantor countries, that did not negotiate the document, can be held politically responsible for approving or rejecting the referenda.

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, by saying Parliament would have the last say on the referendum issue, is admitting that the final responsibility will be with the government.