Short-term solution for Cyprus: Polls again

This is exactly the game that Rauf Denktas is playing. Denktas is a master of playing time-consuming tactics. He is in no hurry to reach a solution to the Cyprus question by May 1, 2004. On the contrary, he repeatedly said that "missing May 1, 2004 is not doomsday."

Further more he wants to miss that date. As a matter of fact, if May 1, 2004 is missed, the Annan plan will be sent to the graveyard of innumerous buried blueprints presented for the ultimate settlement to the problem.

Denktas demonized the Annan plan ranging from qualifying it as "an indecent proposal" to "a document for suicide" he will shed no tears when he sees it scrapped. He, unequivocally termed it as not suitable to be considered as a basis to restart negotiations. He says, he objects to its "philosophy." Thus, for the "old stalwart" of Eastern Mediterrenean politics, the Annan plan cannot be modified. It is beyond rectification and modification. Simply, a non-starter.

Even if the AKP government could convince Denktas’s formidable supporters in Ankara that the Annan plan should be the reference for any endeavor for the settlement of the Cyprus question prior to May 1, 2004 and achieve an "Ankara consensus," it will be a futile effort to negotiate with the Greek Cypriots on the basis of the Annan plan, having Rauf Denktas as the negotiator. He cannot be bowed to negotiate within the framework of a plan which he vilifies and tries to bury once and for all. Negotiating through Denktas will be the guarantee to miss the May 1, 2004 deadline, since he already aims to miss that date.

According to the Turkish Cypriot Constitution, the negotiator is appointed by parliament. However, the newly elected parliament is divided 25 to 25. This cannot permit any change of the negotiator. The logjam will not even permit the formation of a new goverment, as well. The only viable formula was to have a tripartite coalition government formed by the victor of the last elections, M. Ali Talat’s CTP and its ally, also pro-EU, Mustafa Akinci’s BDH (Peace and Democracy Movement), including the "key party" of Denktas Jr., the DP.

Serdar Denktas, (president’s son) who had given some faint "reformist" signals earlier, raising certain hopes that he could be mature enough to move out of his father’s influence and orbit those expectations pinned upon himself. Only ten days after the elections, he made a dramatic U-turn and closed the door to a tripartite coalition government. He seems that he has totally surrendered to his die-hard father and his supporters in the Ankara establishment. Serdar Denktas, apparently displaying a feature of a political lightweight, came out and declared that he will support a government formed by the defeated Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu, unconditionally.

One should ask him about the "raison d’etre" of himself and his party. It is likely that his party will merge with Eroglu’s UBP. After all, DP was formed from a breakaway faction of the UBP, as a result of the machinations of Denktas Sr. who had fallen out with Eroglu at some point. Serdar Denktas was envisaged as "the key" after the elections. He proved to be "the lock" for the settlement.

All this imbroglio points out the impossibility of forming a functional Turkish Cypriot government in a short space of time so it could engage in negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan in order for a re-unified Cyprus to take its place in the EU by May 1, 2004.

The ball was in Ankara’s court when the results of the polls on Dec. 14 was obtained. It is even more so, now. Nonetheless, the AKP government is hesitant to assume responsibility to unlock the Turkish Cypriot logjam. Despite the salvos exchanged between Tayyip Erdogan and Rauf Denktas on the interpretation of the Annan plan, the Turkish government, is swinging over the hole dug by the Turkish Cypriot leader and thereby spending a valuable period that it has to proceed very rapidly. Calls from Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul that the Turkish Cypriots should engage a goverment of national unity indicates the incapacity and inability of the Ankara government for managing the Turkish Cypriot crisis.

A Turkish Cypriot national unity government sounds fine. But on what grounds since the four Turkish Cypriot parties have an unsurmountable wedge concerning their positions on the Annan plan? For Talat and Akinci, to start negotiations on the Annan plan is a sine qua non; while the Denktas-Eroglu duo wants to see it in the garbage bin.

The AKP government is keen not to prejudice Turkey’s EU chances and alienate Turkey’s Western allies; but also unable to take a history-making move. It is wary of Turkey’s fragile domestic balances. It weighs the two and cannot decide what to do, though the decision rests on its shoulders.

The solution is to go to polls again in Cyprus. As soon as possible. The trend in Turkish Cyprus is obvious. Pro-EU forces with the momentum they have, will, most probably, emerge uncontestably victorious.

Then, the hands of the Erdogan government will strengthen to push for the reunification of the island through negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan that needs to be modified.

There is no better realist formula to catch up with the "zeitgeist" and not to miss the May 1, 2004 deadline. Otherwise, reunification of Cyprus and clearing the mines on Turkey’s road to the EU, will be a remote possibility.