Russia’s war might have a new casualty: The Putin-Erdogan bond
In Russia, where President Vladimir Putin’s good relationship with Erdogan is valuable geopolitical currency, the sense that Erdogan may be flipping to a closer, more cooperative relationship with Western leaders seemed to provoke almost as much anxiety as the idea of Sweden joining NATO, raising questions about whether Russia’s war has undermined one of Moscow’s most valued relationships.
The Kremlin’s criticism of Ankara was cautious, but Russian lawmakers and hard-line nationalists bitterly denounced Erdogan, while Russia’s mainstream press questioned whether the Turkish leader is making a lasting, fundamental pivot away from Russia.
A marked change in Erdogan’s tone was evident during Zelensky’s weekend visit to Turkey — his first since the Russian invasion — when the Turkish leader hailed the friendship between the two nations, expressed support for Ukraine’s independence and said it deserved NATO membership.
Days later, his move to unblock Sweden’s entry to NATO was a major strategic blow to Moscow, which has made deterring NATO from accepting new members a centerpiece of its security policy since the 1990s.
Putin’s close relations with the Turkish leader have given Russia a back door on Western sanctions, while the Kremlin’s propaganda machine extols the Russian president as a strong global leader with powerful friends. The two share a desire to challenge Western dominance, a position central to Putin’s professed self-image as a leader waging war on Ukraine to save the world from U.S. hegemony and greedy Western elites.
As Putin faced his greatest challenge during last month’s Wagner mercenary rebellion, Erdogan called him to express his “full support,” according to the Kremlin. Putin moved quickly to congratulate Erdogan after his May election win, calling him a “dear friend.”
But Erdogan’s move over the weekend to free a group of Ukrainian Azov Brigade commanders and others who led the defense of Mariupol and are designated “terrorists” by Moscow was seen as a betrayal.
Russian outrage was amplified by the other signs of Turkish support for Ukraine. Zelensky and Erdogan signed a deal on cooperation in strategic industries, including drones, at the meeting, according to the Ukrainian presidential office, after confirmation last week that construction of a Bayraktar drone plant in Ukraine had begun.
In Moscow, all this news rankled. “Turkey is gradually and steadily continuing to turn from a neutral country into an unfriendly one,” said Viktor Bondarev, chairman of the committee on defense and security in the Federation Council, or upper house of parliament, complaining of Turkey’s recent moves in support of Ukraine.
Russian analyst Sergei Markov said that Erdogan’s decision to hand over the leaders of the Azov Brigade to Zelensky “sent shock waves through Russia,” because Moscow considered the regiment to be “a symbol of Ukrainian neo-Nazism and war crimes against the Russian population.” Pragmatic relations between Moscow and Ankara would continue, “but without trust between the leaders,” he said.
The Kremlin’s irritation about the prisoner release was its sharpest public reaction, especially after regiment commander Denys Prokopenko said they would return to the fight. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov complained of “a violation” of the prisoner swap deal and Russia demanded explanations in a call between the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers on Sunday.
But potentially more worrying for Moscow was a comment last week by Ukrainian general staff spokesman Oleksiy Gromov that Ukraine was expecting to get Turkish T-155 Firtina self-propelled howitzers. Turkey has not confirmed the transfer.
If Turkey gives Ukraine the T-155 Firtina, “this would mean that a qualitative change has taken place in Turkey’s policy regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict,” according to an editorial in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
Peskov publicly downplayed Moscow’s dismay that Turkey opened the gate to Sweden joining NATO, saying that Moscow understood Turkey’s NATO obligations.
“This has never been a secret for us. We have never worn rose-colored glasses in this respect,” Peskov said Tuesday. He said Russia would continue to pursue common interests important to both countries.
Turkey and Russia have been on opposite sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, but relations between the two leaders had remained surprisingly close, even as Moscow’s relations with NATO plummeted.
The importance of these ties to both sides is evidenced by statistics on Turkish exports to Russia, which have soared since the invasion of Ukraine, from $2.6 billion in the first half of last year to $4.9 billion in the same period this year, while Turkish imports of Russian oil also grew sharply in 2022 — an economic windfall thanks to Turkey’s refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia.
At the heart of Erdogan’s calculations, according to analysts, is ameliorating Turkey’s economic crisis of high inflation, a plunging lira and exports to other countries in decline. Despite the increased trade with Russia, Turkey’s overall exports fell by 10.5 percent to $20.9 billion in June, compared with June of last year, according to Turkish trade figures.
Before the recent elections in Turkey, Erdogan won help from Moscow to contend with an unusually strong opposition challenge, when Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom deferred a $600 million gas payment until 2024.
But afterward, he adopted a number of Turkish opposition campaign pledges as his own, including the pursuit of better relations with the West. On Monday, he called for the European Union to “open the way” for Turkey to join, after its application stalled in 2019.
Evren Balta, a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Ozyegin University, said it was “too early to say whether Turkey is turning its face to the West right now,” rather than adapting to changed circumstances, including the need to attract investment as the country struggles through an economic crisis.
Now, “the needs of Turkish foreign policy, and the structural needs of the Turkish economy have changed,” Balta said, citing Turkey’s desire to attract Western investment.
Turkey had been “normalizing” its foreign policy for several years, with outreach to adversaries such as Greece, Israel and Persian Gulf states, she said. Turkey has also been seeking to conclude a $20 billion deal for F-16 fighter jets with the United States, which is seen as a key motive in Erdogan’s move to drop the veto on Sweden joining NATO.
Timur Kuran, an economist and political scientist at Duke University, said he saw Erdogan’s “dizzying moves to return Turkey to the Western fold” as potentially signaling a break with Russia.
“This pivot may be tactical; his visceral hostility to the West is well-known,” Kuran tweeted, but he added that the pivot could prove lasting if it brought more Western investment.
In Moscow, there is a conviction that Erdogan’s desire to stand up against Western global dominance will always be a trump card for Russia. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, played on Turkish resentment of what it sees as Western arrogance with a dig at Turkey’s long, unsuccessful mission to join the E.U.
In Europe, “no one wants to see Turkey in Europe,” he said Tuesday, asked about Moscow’s fears that Turkey may be pivoting to the West. “Our Turkish partners should have no illusions about that.”
The Kremlin values its ties with Erdogan, but Russian nationalists, an unpredictable and increasingly influential political grouping, have soured on him.
Russian state television journalist and military blogger Andrey Medvedev said it was no surprise that Erdogan had conned Russia. “What is he, our ally? A friend? No, and he has never been. Russia has no allies. No friends, either. There are tactical partners. And those, in general, pursue their own goals. So there’s little hope in them.”
Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia; Fahim reported from Istanbul; and Stern reported from Kyiv. Natalia Abbakumova in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.
