Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment

Report

September 13, 2024 • 12:00 am ET

Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment

By
Maryna Vorotnyuk

This chapter is part of a report on the prospects for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Western countries in the Black Sea region in the new geopolitical setting following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

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The rise of the strategic weight of the Black Sea

Experts widely agree that the Black Sea region has remained a blind spot for the West since the Cold War. Despite NATO and the European Union and individual states declaring “interests” in the area, no attempts to formulate a strategic vision for the Black Sea have been made until recently. Sporadic discussions about the region’s neglect surfaced following Russia’s military campaigns in 2008 (against Georgia) and 2014 (in Ukraine), but the spotlight truly trained on the region after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its increased military activity in the Black Sea.

The urgent push to develop a strategy to strengthen the West’s presence in the region now is a positive development. For instance, the Black Sea Security Act, passed as part of the US 2024 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the development of a formal US strategy with regard to the Black Sea region. 

The West’s presence in the area is upheld by three NATO states (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania), NATO partners Ukraine and Georgia, EU members Romania and Bulgaria, and three EU candidate states (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia). Despite the Black Sea’s geopolitical importance, it was often viewed as on the periphery, based on Russia’s historical perception of the region as its strategic backyard. Today, it has gained prominence as a critical area for Western interests. The outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war and the resulting new security framework in the Black Sea are seen as pivotal elements in the broader European and global architecture.

Turkey’s role, significant in its own right, has been heightened by the increasing importance of the Black Sea to the broader West. As the most militarily capable NATO member in the region and a longstanding architect of regional security, Turkey’s pivotal role in managing escalation is acknowledged by its partners. With centuries of experience in dealings with Russia, a strong rapport with Russian decision-makers in the modern period, and participation in collective efforts to contain Russia at the same time, Turkey is recognized as uniquely positioned to address the resurgence of Russian influence. While doubts persist regarding its autonomy vis-à-vis Russia, Turkey’s contributions in the Black Sea region have proven invaluable to Western partners on numerous occasions.

Turkey’s mediating potential and position on NATO’s eastern flank are noteworthy. Amid strained Turkey-West relations, Ankara’s pursuit of strategic autonomy has sometimes clashed with the perspectives and policies of its Western allies. Although Turkey’s approach has posed challenges to the Alliance’s cohesion when it appears to contradict common positions, Ankara’s special position is widely acknowledged.

Engaging Turkey as a mere conduit for Western interests in the Black Sea region would likely be a futile endeavor. Nevertheless, Turkey possesses unmatched experience and influence in Europe’s eastern neighborhood. With better-aligned policies, Turkey and the West could synergize their shared interests, and bring about results unlikely to be accomplished by either party alone.

Turkey as a Black Sea power

Acknowledging Turkey’s potential for playing a greater stabilizing role in the Black Sea should not overshadow the reality that Turkey itself lacks a clearly defined strategy for the Black Sea.

Turkey’s lack of a clear stand-alone Black Sea regional conception is widely understood. Unlike many states that articulate their objectives and assessments through public strategic documents, Turkey does not have a formal codified vision for its foreign policy strategy, particularly regarding the Black Sea.

Turkey’s primary perceived sources of insecurity historically lie beyond the Black Sea region, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Consequently, its focus on these areas has overshadowed the development of a distinct Black Sea strategy. The government’s prioritization of terrorism as the primary security threat is logical, as Turkish armed forces are engaged in operations aimed at combating this threat across theaters such as Syria and Iraq. The only genuinely and publicly problematic relationship Turkey has in the Black Sea region is with Armenia. Its relationship with Russia is considered as a potential source of tension, but a manageable one.

Central to Ankara’s stance in the Black Sea has been the delicate balancing act between Russia and the West, a principle likely to endure. Turkey has perceived a greater Western presence in the region as unwarranted. For instance, when Russia annexed Crimea, the West’s relatively muted response resonated with Turkey’s preference to avoid direct confrontation with Russia.

Turkey’s Black Sea policy has been likened to a “chimera,” representing a multifaceted paradigm composed of disparate elements and diverse policy directions. Indeed, Ankara’s foreign policy in the Black Sea region appears fragmented, reflecting a multilayered system of interests and a combination of approaches toward Russia, the South Caucasus subregion, Ukraine, and both NATO and the EU. Moreover, Turkey’s Black Sea vision is notably centered around Russia.

Since 2022, the situation has evolved, prompting Turkey to reassess security threats emanating from the Black Sea, which has transformed into an active battlefield that poses a more tangible threat to Turkey. The region is heavily mined and commercial navigation is partially obstructed, adversely affecting all littoral states. The foundations of the regional order that Turkey had sought to nurture have crumbled. Multilateral institutions, the principle of regional ownership, unimpeded trade flows, and the stability and peace guaranteed by the Montreux Convention are jeopardized.

In this environment, Western partners are placing more pressure on Turkey to change its flexible balancing posture and instead align more closely with its NATO allies. This alignment entails supporting the Alliance’s efforts to bolster its defense and deterrence posture against Russia on the eastern flank. A crisis in relations between Russia and the West has been described as an opportunity for Turkey to reestablish its Euro-Atlantic orientation and to reassert its central security role in the Alliance after years of estrangement.

There is scant evidence, however, to suggest that Turkey is undergoing a strategic shift away from its traditional posture. Balancing continues to be Turkey’s preferred approach, with its approach to Russia’s war against Ukraine seen by Turkish policymakers as a means to reaffirm its pivotal role—in line with its aspirations as a middle power with global ambitions.

Shared interests in the Black Sea

For decades, Turkey and its Western partners have collaborated on issues of common interest: e.g., the pursuit of stability in the Black Sea region, countering Russian revisionism, bolstering the resilience of post-Soviet states and supporting their European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and leveraging the region’s potential in terms of energy, transportation, and connectivity. The collaboration has been marked by varying approaches and difficulties, notably concerning the involvement of external, non-regional powers in regional affairs. In recent years, mutual distrust and substantial estrangement have defined Turkey-West relations. The overall alignment of foreign policy priorities is notably limited: there is, for example, considerable divergence between Turkey’s foreign policy and the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), as indicated by a notably low alignment rate, averaging only 10 percent, according to the European Commission.

The Black Sea cannot be isolated from the broader context of the generally problematic relationship between Turkey and the West. To overcome the deep-seated distrust of Ankara and facilitate aligning and coordinating its actions with its partners would require considerable efforts and deconflicting of Turkey-West relations, sometimes on tracks that have nothing to do with the Black Sea itself.

Beyond existing tensions, there is a fundamental challenge in identifying areas of shared interest in the Black Sea region specifically. The Black Sea has not been a priority for many countries, including the United States, leading to a lack of specific Black Sea strategies or codified visions. Differing perceptions among individual states on how to address the Black Sea, particularly in response to a resurgent Russia, further complicate efforts to coordinate joint Turkey-West actions.
It is worth noting that Turkey also shares some profound interests in the Black Sea with Russia. Even amid Moscow’s war against Ukraine, Turkey and Russia have strengthened their strategic partnership, collaborating on coordinated actions in the Black Sea. Turkey’s narrative of emphasizing regional ownership of the Black Sea and questioning the need for a larger NATO role, particularly from the United States, aligns closely with Russia’s vision. Long-term shared interests such as energy and trade contribute to this alignment—and the West often cannot offer Turkey the same incentives that Russia can. Moscow, for instance, is prepared to provide immediate security benefits and economic relief, as demonstrated by its decision to defer payments for natural gas ahead of the 2023 Turkish general elections.  Conversely, there also is recognition that Turkey’s relationship with the West, of which it is an integral part, remains indispensable to Ankara, making a genuine shift toward Russia unlikely.

There are several areas of shared interests for Turkey and the West, as outlined below.

Pursuing stability and restoration of the regional security order

Restoring the regional security order in the Black Sea, which is not Russia-dictated and shaped by its coercion, seems to be a common denominator for both Turkish and Western visions for the Black Sea. This implies restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, bolstering their resilience through solid democratic anchoring and future EU membership, and supporting eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.

At the same time, Turkey’s view of stability in the Black Sea is connected to nonescalation strategy.  Turkey perceives itself as a “central country,” – a state with a key geostrategic position – and simultaneously a frontline or outpost state. Given Turkey’s complex geography and its proximity to turbulence across the Middle East, Mediterranean, Balkans, Black Sea, and South Caucasus, it has developed a strong frontier state mentality and identity, which dictates caution in exercising foreign policy.

This focus on nonescalation can be seen in some of Turkey’s recent actions. It calls for the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture to be “feasible, affordable, and sustainable,” and tailored to the region’s specificities, including the Russian military buildup. (For more on maritime security and defense cooperation, see parts 2 and 3.) According to Turkey’s interpretation, NATO’s presence in the region should prioritize measures to avoid provocations. For example, Turkey blocked the creation of a “Black Sea flotilla” by littoral allies, arguing that it would have remained vulnerable to Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, thus exacerbating tensions.

Despite Turkey’s reluctance to allow greater Western involvement in the region and to openly confront Russia, it is not risk averse. Its actions in the shared neighborhood of the South Caucasus, and efforts to balance its relations with Russia through deeper cooperation with Ukraine before and during the war indicate that Turkey perceives Russian revisionism as a threat to the very stability that Ankara attempts to preserve at all costs. While Turkey may not openly acknowledge this threat in the same way as other allied nations do, its desire to maintain equilibrium in the Black Sea and keep Russia in check is an important factor that aligns it closely with the Western vision.

Adhering to the Montreux Convention as a balancing instrument

Turkey’s crucial role as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea is generally in line with Western interests. Ankara, renowned for its fervent commitment to the convention, holds the power to control the transit of warships from belligerent and nonlittoral states during times of war. Turkey recognizes its unique position in the Black Sea, a role that has been acknowledged and esteemed by its Western allies. The Montreux Convention is generally perceived as serving the interests of all signatories and the international community, and any attempt to undermine it, per Turkish experts, would be tantamount to shaking a pillar of the international order.

In February 2022, Turkey invoked the Montreux Convention, applying it to both Ukrainian and Russian warships, as well as nonlittoral states.

. Despite the absence of external NATO powers’ warships in the Black Sea, there is a recognition that the Montreux Convention helps maintain a delicate balance in the region, and that this equilibrium in the Black Sea is to Ukraine’s advantage. (For more on the miliary implications of the convention, see part 2.)

Clarity about future application of the Montreux Convention should be a common interest for Turkey and its Western counterparts, as this will define the naval component of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture.

Strengthening Turkey’s regional leadership

Leveraging Turkey’s convening power and its experience in dealing with the multifaceted Black Sea region could be significant for Turkey-West cooperation. Turkey’s status as a regional leader is clear-cut. While the Black Sea may not be a primary strategic priority for Turkey, it perceives itself as a natural regional leader due to its central location.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey has advocated for strong multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea: In 1992, it spearheaded the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). In 2001, Turkey championed the creation of security-related formats including the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BlackSeaFor), and in 2004, the Black Sea Harmony initiative, adding to an early emphasis on multilateral cooperation in economic sphere.

Turkey also has been actively involved for decades in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, regions that Russia considers to be part of its sphere of privileged influence. This competition remains a dynamic and potentially conflictual aspect of the Turkish-Russian relationship.

Whenever Russia has openly undermined the regional balance and resorted to force, Turkey appeared to have accepted Moscow’s actions as a fait accompli and did not openly confront Russia. However, Turkey continues to harbor ambitions of maintaining its position as a regional leader, and aims to counterbalance Russian revisionism. There have been indications that with Russia heavily engaged in Ukraine for an indefinite period, depleting its resources, and redeploying some of its troops from other conflicts (such as Georgia’s occupied regions and Syria) to support its war effort in Ukraine, Turkey seeks to enhance its presence in their shared neighborhood.

In the South Caucasus, Turkey supports Azerbaijan and seeks a more even distribution of influence in the region. With Russia presumably losing its preponderant position in the South Caucasus, both because of the war in Ukraine and the inflation of its security guarantees to Armenia, Turkey may explore arising leadership opportunities. The efforts to normalize relations with Armenia and advocacy for a six-state regional cooperation platform (bringing together the three South Caucasus states plus Russia, Turkey and Iran) are evidence of Turkey’s ambition to play a leadership role in the region. 

Acknowledging Turkey’s role in subtly challenging Russia in what the latter perceives as its geopolitical backyard, and understanding how to incentivize Turkey to engage through all available levers with regional states (particularly in the South Caucasus), is of crucial importance to the West. Supporting Turkey’s interest in normalizing relations with Armenia, facilitating a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and promoting stability in the South Caucasus through connectivity projects could serve as a platform for aligning Turkish and Western interests.

Containing Russia, supporting Ukraine

A common thread in Turkey-Western relations is the shared goal of containing Russia and supporting Ukraine. However, significant disparities exist in the scope and character of actions taken, as well as in the narratives that explain the policies pursued.

Many analysts have characterized Turkey’s actions as a “balancing act,” a term frequently employed to encapsulate Turkey’s stance. There is a growing consensus, however, that this term requires more nuance. It could be argued that Turkey’s policy does not entail maintaining equidistance between the two conflicting parties. Instead, there is a discernible pro-Ukrainian leaning, along with an official acknowledgment of the imperative to uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a fundamental precondition for enduring stability in the region. The “geopolitical DNA” of Turkey’s relations with Russia and Ukraine exhibit fundamental structural differences. Turkey has sought to maintain an approach of being pro-Kyiv, without being overtly anti-Moscow.

Ukraine has emerged as a strategic partner for Turkey in curbing Russia’s expansionism in the Black Sea region. Turkey’s relations with Ukraine are aimed at salvaging what remains of the shattered equilibrium in the Black Sea, and halting or at least containing Russian revisionist ambitions. By supporting Ukraine, Turkey strives to build a scenario where Russia “bleeds out in Ukraine,” giving space for Turkey’s unhindered regional ambitions. Turkey’s position is to prevent both Russia’s full defeat and victory.

Ukraine and Turkey have burgeoning defense industry relations. In the face of sanctions from its allies due to Turkey’s Syria operation or purchase of the Russian S-400 system, Turkey has intensified its cooperation with Ukraine, which has emerged as an alternative supplier of critical technologies and equipment.

Turkey has not recognized Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and has protested against the human rights violations on the peninsula. Ankara has joined the Crimea Platform, which Kyiv launched as an “international consultation and coordination format” to deoccupy Crimea. After Russia’s reinvasion in 2022, Turkey applied the Montreux Convention, preventing Russia from reinforcing its navy in the Black Sea, which has been a significant support to Ukraine’s battlefield efforts. But Turkey has not been willing to pay the economic costs of challenging Russia more robustly through implementing Western sanctions or closing its airspace. Since 2014, when sanctions were introduced after Russia’s initial aggression against Ukraine, Turkey has remained critical of them as an instrument of foreign policy. Ankara is the only NATO member to abstain from introducing sanctions. After the February 2022 reinvasion, Turkey’s position did not change.

Turkey’s transactional and compartmentalized relations with Russia have flourished in recent decades. Both states maintain a competitive stance regarding their shared neighborhood, despite their cooperative engagements. As a result, the bilateral relationship has been termed a “cooperative rivalry,” “competitive cooperation,” and an “adversarial collaboration,” reflecting its hybrid nature.

The bilateral relationship is built on an interdependence that is structural and long term. In recent decades, the quest to develop strategic autonomy from the West has prompted a Turkish pivot toward Moscow and deepened its interdependence with Russia. Though Turkey is often identified as being disproportionately dependent on Russia, in fact Russia relies significantly on Turkey, especially in light of its growing isolation.

One of the most consequential deals that Russia and Turkey made was Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. The acquisition had a profound impact on Turkey’s relations with the United States and other allies. Russia is also constructing Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, hailed as the biggest project in the history of Russian-Turkish relations, and the world’s first power plant project implemented according to the build-own-operate model (Rosatom’s stake is 99.2 percent).

There are a variety of opinions on the extent to which the lack of Turkish sanctions has enabled Russia’s economic survival and ability to carry out warfare against Ukraine. One opinion is that though Turkey may have indirectly enhanced Moscow’s resilience, it plays a “more consequential role on the operational and tactical levels” in helping Ukraine’s defense efforts. There is no denying Turkey’s significant, albeit low-profile, contribution to Ukraine’s war effort, and its efforts to bolster NATO’s posture in domains other than naval ones in the Black Sea. The critical question pertains to quantifying the damage inflicted on these very policies by Turkey’s simultaneous facilitation of Russia. Allowing Russia to evade sanctions poses a detriment, which at times outweighs the benefits of Turkey’s actions for its own, Ukraine’s, or NATO’s security.

Turkey needs to be engaged on issues related to containing Russia, sanctions evasion, and reducing its reliance on Russia in the energy sector. One promising avenue for cooperation is potential defense collaboration involving Ukraine, Turkey, and third parties, such as the United Kingdom (see part 3 on military cooperation). The fact that Turkey’s approach sometimes aligns favorably with Russia does not necessarily mean that Turkey adopts this approach for Russia’s benefit. Identifying ways to safeguard Turkey’s interests while simultaneously reducing Ankara’s dependence on Russia is crucial in establishing common ground for cooperation between Turkey and the West in the Black Sea region.

Employing Turkey’s mediation endeavors

Russia’s war against Ukraine has presented Ankara with an opportunity to enhance its international standing by offering mediation between Ukraine and Russia, aligning with its broader strategy of positioning Turkey as a mediator between Russia and the West. Since 2014, Turkey has asserted itself as a bridge between Russia and the transatlantic community, emphasizing that maintaining relations with both Russia and the Alliance is both essential and not mutually exclusive, given Turkey’s complex geographical context.

Following Russia’s reinvasion in February 2022, Turkey facilitated several rounds of negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. Ankara, in collaboration with the United Nations, mediated the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which operated for one year until Russia withdrew from it in July 2023.

Turkey has mediated Ukraine-Russia prisoner exchanges, including the 2017 release of Crimean Tatar dissidents from Russian captivity and the 2022 release of 215 Ukrainian prisoners. Turkey also played a facilitating role in the major prisoner exchange between Russia and the West in August 2024, providing Ankara Airport as the venue for the swap and reinforcing its international reputation as a mediator.

There are significant caveats to Ankara’s actions as a mediator. While some of Turkey’s interventions, such as the grain deal and facilitating a prisoner exchange, have been effective, its efforts to broker a peace settlement in the early stages of the war failed. Ankara is not positioned to change Russia’s strategic objectives to subjugate Ukraine. Additionally, its practice of not sharing information or coordinating with its allies has somewhat limited the effectiveness of its initiatives, as noted by a UK official interviewed for this research. There is a need for greater engagement with Turkey to explore how its mediation capabilities can be utilized to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace for Ukraine in closer coordination with allies.

Strengthening NATO’s posture in the Black Sea

One of the mutual security interests between Turkey and the West is to bolster NATO’s flank in the Black Sea. Despite its anti-Western rhetoric, Turkey has contributed to the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO and its overall capabilities. The country hosts several NATO commands and a major base in Incirlik, and has contributed to NATO’s maritime operations and stabilization efforts. Post-2014, Turkey has invested heavily in its armed forces and boosted its security cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia, including supporting their NATO membership aspirations. Turkey has also consistently complied with all measures and decisions of the Alliance aimed at enhancing NATO’s defense and security posture since 2014.

However, Turkey’s inclination to pursue an autonomous foreign policy often brings it into conflict with its NATO membership, prompting questions about whether Turkey serves as NATO’s pillar in the Black Sea or acts as an obstructionist power.

There are indications that Turkey, as a status quo power and a proponent of the principle of regional ownership of security, has sought to maintain a balance of power in the region, curbing more assertive positions of nonregional actors. Amid growing tensions between Russia and NATO, Turkey has chosen a policy of “caution” and defending the status quo. This has sometimes led to Turkey limiting NATO’s role in the region, such as preventing the deployment of Active Endeavour operation to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean Sea, where NATO ships patrolled to deter terrorism from 2001 to 2016. Additionally, Turkey’s advocacy for a comprehensive peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, through platforms like the “3+3” regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, underscores its belief in regional states’ ability to “solve their problems by themselves.”

The emergence of Russia as a revisionist power intent on reshaping the regional security order has made maintaining the status quo untenable. There is a growing consensus among experts and practitioners that Turkey’s principle of regional ownership has become obsolete in the evolving security environment of the Black Sea. Presently, Turkey seems inclined to focus on cooperation among allied nations in the region and, depending on Russia’s behavior and evolving security dynamics, to revitalize the regional ownership format as the basis for a new security architecture in the region.

Divergent threat perception as a main obstacle to pursue shared interests

Deep-seated divergences in threat perception limit the potential of Turkey and the West pursuing shared interests. Turkey perceives the Ukraine-Russia war as an isolated regional conflict—despite the implications of the war for the regional order that Turkey has meticulously worked to build and sustain. This disparity is evident in the differing levels of attention given to Russia’s war against Ukraine in the everyday politics of Turkey compared to other NATO members.

Turkey’s position in the Black Sea is closely intertwined with its Syria policy, a conflict that has taken precedent in Turkish foreign policy over Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Turkey views Russia as a threat, as commonly referenced by Turkish experts, this sentiment is not openly manifested. Unlike the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, which labels Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” Turkish officials do not use similar definitions, and Russia is not formally defined as a threat at the governmental level. Notably, the necessity of managing Russia on two fronts is unique and contributes to a distinct threat perception. This entails addressing the risks associated with the potential of being outflanked by Russia from both the north and the south.

Turkey’s portrayal of Russia’s war against Ukraine appears to be selective rather than comprehensive. Its attention to that war revolves around three major tracks. The first deals with maritime security and includes issues such as Turkey’s application of the Montreux Convention and demining of the Black Sea. The second track has been concerned with the Black Sea Grain initiative, a now-defunct deal brokered by Turkey and the UN involving Ukraine and Russia. Lastly, Turkey’s interest lies in continuing to serve as a mediator; it mediated between Russia and Ukraine in the early weeks of the war and facilitated prisoner exchanges, including the 2024 prisoner swap between Russia and the West.

Despite Turkey’s condemnation of Russia’s aggression and Ankara’s refusal to recognize the occupied Ukrainian regions, Turkey’s perception of the war against Ukraine is somewhat similar to the official Russian narrative. Public discourse in Turkey underscores the war as a competition between the great powers, with Russia defending itself from Western encroachment and provocations, rather than as an unjust and unprovoked war. In a September 2022 poll, only 21 percent of Turkish respondents considered Russia to bear the primary responsibility for the war in Ukraine, and 46 percent said that Ukraine and Russia are equally responsible.

The majority of constituencies in Turkey support the government’s balancing policies following the onset of the war. Similarly, a consensus exists—from the government to the opposition—regarding the importance of the Montreux Convention. Within the political establishment of the country, there is a semblance of agreement that “Ukraine needs to win, but Russia should not suffer defeat either.”

This situation may stem from Turkey’s perceived grievances regarding insufficient acknowledgment of its security concerns among its Western partners, who presumably overlook the broader threats Turkey faces beyond those in the Black Sea region. While bridging this gap in understanding could prove challenging, it is essential to recognize that the security threats confronting all parties are not fundamentally different.

Conclusions and recommendations (Part 1)

There are numerous areas where the interests of Turkey and its Western allies align, particularly concerning the restoration of regional security in the Black Sea and leveraging the region’s transit potential. However, differences in perception regarding the nature of threats and the preferred policies to address them have frequently emerged.

Turkey’s strained relationship with the West and its autonomous foreign policy approach together impose inherent limitations on efforts to harmonize policies, even in areas where mutual action could yield significant impact through clearer communication and coordination. In reality, the West has limited influence over Turkey’s perception of its national interests, especially in the Black Sea region, given the historical complexities of their relationship.

Special attention should be directed toward emphasizing that Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy must involve reducing its dependencies on Russia and addressing societal, economic, and security vulnerabilities that Russia readily exploits. This underscores the importance of Turkey closing the loopholes that allow Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, for instance stopping the reexport of dual-use goods and technology to Russia, thereby preventing the enablement of Russia’s malign policies, which has been in direct conflict with Turkey’s own interests. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the presence of and risks associated with Russia’s influence operations in Turkey, which serve to amplify anti-Western narratives.

In the medium term, Turkey may be becoming increasingly inclined to contemplate and endorse initiatives aimed at reestablishing a security equilibrium advantageous to Western (including Turkish) interests and implementing some form of provisional security order pending Ukraine’s victory. While Ankara currently appears to be one of the few NATO states not engaged in negotiations regarding security guarantees for Ukraine, the current environment seems conducive to practical projects that enhance Ukraine-West cooperation, with Turkey playing an active role. Ankara may be willing to consider multilateral projects aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s military capabilities without placing itself at the forefront of confrontation with Russia, yet still providing a more meaningful deterrent against Russia. Turkey’s desire to support Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction efforts should also be welcomed.

It’s important to address the fragmented security architecture in the region. This can be done by leveraging Turkey’s potential by establishing a military cooperation mechanism that complements NATO activities and involves Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania (with the possibility of including Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova); and supporting allied and partner countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia) in upgrading their naval capabilities and coordinating with Turkey to develop individual maritime security action plans. This effort would rely heavily on Turkey’s willingness to approve of and engage in these activities. According to Turkey watchers interviewed for this research, there is a prevailing opinion that exploring the idea of establishing new cooperation models in the Black Sea is worthwhile, particularly while the regional ownership principle is defunct due to Russia’s position. However, as noted by a UK expert in an interview, it is unlikely that Turkey will take on the role of a “convenor” or an “instigator power” behind all-regional formats (including littoral states plus potentially external NATO powers) with only Russia excluded. Instead, Turkey is more likely to express interest in initiating and participating in “minilateral” initiatives.

US-Turkey relations are central to Western engagement with Turkey. Significant changes in Turkey’s stance on contentious Black Sea issues would require a broader reconciliation between Turkey and the United States. Furthermore, the incremental progress toward normalizing EU-Turkey relations has been identified as a significant factor facilitating potential greater coordination in the Black Sea. This could entail prioritizing steps such as upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union, which one of the interviewees considered more achievable than implementing a visa-free regime or revitalizing membership talks. The need to renew a regular and structured foreign and security policy dialogue between Turkey and the EU, focusing on joint strategies in their shared neighborhood, seems to be a priority among many analysts.

There are areas of overlapping interests where Turkey could benefit from aligning with the common position of its allies, especially amid a broader normalization of relations. Exploring avenues of cooperation and fostering a more cooperative engagement culture is essential. While any unilateral initiative from Turkey that can leverage its influence on Russia should be welcomed, greater emphasis should be placed on fostering closer coordination with allies to make sure that a principle of containing Russia is not undermined by such actions.

To be sure, asignificant departure from Turkey’s current stance is unlikely, but as the number of areas of Turkish-Western policy convergence grows, a shift in approach is possible. The goal should be to encourage Turkey to explore these areas and for Western partners to move away from short-term thinking and transactional approaches in dealing with Turkey and instead focus on addressing shared long-term strategic concerns. While it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate alignment of security perceptions, the actual interests of the parties are more closely aligned than is publicly acknowledged.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment.”

About the author

Dr. Maryna Vorotnyuk is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) in London. Previously, she held the position as Research Fellow in the International Security Studies team at RUSI. She works on security developments in the Black Sea region, Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish foreign policies, and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Before joining RUSI in January 2021, she worked as a researcher for the Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies at the Central European University in Budapest (2017-2020), and as a visiting lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences of Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia (2015-2017). From 2006 until 2015, Maryna was affiliated with the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine and the Centre for International Studies of Mechnikov Odesa National University. 

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Further reading

Image: Swiss Federal President Viola Amherd, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Czech President Petr Pavel, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, Argentinian President Javier Milei, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, Polish President Andrzej Duda and other leaders pose for a family photo, on the day of the opening ceremony of the Summit on Peace in Ukraine at the Buergenstock Resort in Stansstad near Lucerne, Switzerland, June 15, 2024.