Nato must wake up to Russia’s nuclear power deal with Turkey

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The writer is director of the Turkey programme at the Middle East Institute and author of ‘Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria’

Ask Nato’s secretary-general to name the decision of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that irks him the most and he’d probably say purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile defence system. But Nato has an even bigger problem when it comes to Turkey-Russia ties: the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. 

Erdoğan likes to call the facility, being built by Russia’s state-owned Rosatom on the Mediterranean coast, “Turkey’s first nuclear power plant”. In reality, it belongs to Russia. In the standard engineering, procurement and construction model, the supplier designs and builds the reactor before turning over the keys. Akkuyu uses a build-own-operate (BOO) model unprecedented for the industry. Russia retains majority ownership but bears all the financial, operational and construction risks.

Moscow’s all-inclusive package covers construction, operation and personnel training, handling spent nuclear fuel and the ultimate decommissioning — all very appealing for a nuclear newcomer like Turkey. BOO contracts are expensive for Moscow, which is why Russia has only implemented it at Akkuyu and is reluctant to use it again. But President Vladimir Putin must have thought that the benefits of owning strategic infrastructure in a Nato country outweigh the financial risks. He’s probably right. 

As someone born and raised a few miles from the plant, I am deeply concerned. The lack of transparency around the process, environmental risks and Rosatom’s poor safety record worry me and millions of locals. Western countries might dismiss such concerns and even praise Turkey for its green transition, but Akkuyu is also a Nato problem — a long-term one. 

The Akkuyu project was hailed by Erdoğan as his plan to reduce Turkey’s energy dependence, particularly on Russia. But instead of doing that, the BOO arrangement binds Turkey and Russia together for the next century, through an expected 60-year operating cycle and the subsequent decommissioning process. 

Turkey’s opposition parties are against the project. To shield it, Erdoğan signed an intergovernmental agreement with Putin, making it constitutionally impossible for a post-Erdoğan government to contest it. That means Russia, known for using energy as a geopolitical weapon, will have direct control over strategic infrastructure in a Nato country for 100 years, no matter who is in power. 

And that’s not all. Akkuyu NPP is close to Incirlik air base, home to Nato’s largest nuclear weapons storage facility and a hub for supporting alliance missions. The plant is also in close proximity to Nato’s ballistic missile defence radar facility at Kürecik. The BOO contract puts Russian personnel and assets near these Nato installations. Turkey may build another radar to protect the plant. Military analysts and defence officials fear that since Akkuyu NPP belongs to Russia, Moscow might demand to operate this radar and bring in troops to provide security. Yankı Bağcıoğlu, a retired rear admiral who is deputy chair of the opposition Republican People’s party (CHP) in charge of national defence, told me Erdoğan must not let this happen. 

The west has largely overlooked Russia’s use of nuclear energy to create long-term political, economic and military ties with strategically important countries. While Turkey was criticised and placed under sanctions for purchasing the S-400, western countries have been muted on Akkuyu. But now Turkey wants to build a second nuclear reactor and Russia is ahead in the bid. To deprive Moscow of a geopolitical asset and allay locals’ safety and environmental concerns, the west must do more to match Moscow’s favourable terms. Pressuring western development banks to drop their reluctance to finance nuclear energy projects would be a great start.