Interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty in Turkey
As the second-largest military within NATO, Turkey maintains a significant partnership with Russia. Even when bombing Northern Syria, it maintained a stance of waiting in the wings until the right moment, such as when a drone was shot down by the Americans.
Furthermore, Turkey is a maritime nation, encompassed by seas on three coasts.
It shares the Black Sea with Russia to the north-east, contends with a long-standing continental shelf dispute with Greece in the Aegean to the west, and grapples with perennial issues in the Mediterranean, including the Cyprus conflict and escalating maritime disputes regarding oil drilling issues.
Turkey’s accession to the Svalbard Treaty is framed in a scientific report as a move signalling a shift as “From the blue homeland to the open seas”.
This dual approach does not reflect the behaviour of a great power or regional power, but rather a statecraft and diplomatic strategy that lurks in the background and emerges onto the global stage when strategically advantageous. The Svalbard Treaty is one of these instances.
In Turkey, where domestic politics often drive foreign policy, the promises made domestically are much more important than how they will be perceived abroad and whether they are realistic. Consequently, there is a possibility that this misperception has been deliberately cultivated for specific domestic purposes.
While Turkish membership application to the Treaty will be on its way to Paris, I would have liked to engage in a discussion on the Svalbard policy with a decision maker from Ankara, but it seems that even the Storting encounters probably challenges in obtaining clear answers to their inquiries on this matter.
