Europeanisation of Turkish Democracy?
The Copenhagen Summit of December 2003 concluded that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay". This decision was received with considerable disappointment in Turkey as general expectations had been raised in the country by the political elites as well as by the media that the decision to actually launch accession negotiations with Turkey would have been taken at that Summit.
Despite some theories circulated by the more fervent eurosceptics in Turkey, this disillusionment has not led to a slowdown in the reform process that was already initiated in 2002 with three "democratisation packages", nor has it led to the abandonment of the "EU Project" – as it is often referred to in Turkey. Just the opposite, in fact, has happened. It has led to an enormous effort on the part of the government to undertake the necessary reforms to meet the political criteria in the time remaining, as well as serving to further unify and thus strengthen the pro-EU circles in Turkish society.
The government’s determination to proceed with the reform process came as a surprise to many who were expecting just the opposite from the ruling Islamist party – or as they prefer to call themselves, the "conservative democrat" party – the AKP. AKP has effectively utilised the prospect of EU membership and the reform process associated with it to eradicate the doubts over the party’s credentials as to its commitment to Western democratic values and to gain legitimacy in both the international sphere and in the domestic arena, specifically vis-à-vis the Turkish military. AKP’s desire to establish itself firmly in the centre rather than in the overtly and more radical religious fringes of the Turkish political party system coupled with the strong support of the opposition party to EU membership has created an environment that is highly conducive to the reform process.
Against this background, four comprehensive sets of democratic reforms have entered into force in the year 2003, aiming to improve the most criticised aspects of Turkish democracy, such as limits to freedom of speech and expression, freedom of associations, torture and mistreatment along with the strong influence of the military on domestic politics.
How close these packages have actually brought Turkey to fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria at this stage is a point of controversy, leading to the emergence of varying opinions both within the EU as well as within Turkey. It goes without saying that in terms of legislation, Turkey has indeed come a long way, undertaking certain reforms that far exceed what an observer of the 1990s would have thought imaginable. Prior to the Copenhagen Summit, significant legislation has been passed, expanding the freedom of thought and expression, lifting the barriers for the acquisition of properties by the foundation of religious minorities and abolishing the legal restrictions on teaching and broadcasting in local dialects and languages, namely Kurdish.
With the two democratisation packages that entered into force in January 2003, the Law on Political Parties was amended to introduce new measures that make it more difficult to close down political parties. Restrictions on the political party membership of persons brought to trial on the basis of their political ideas have been lifted and penalties for incidences of torture could no longer be delayed or turned into fines. These two reform packages have also expanded the freedom of the press, eased the procedures for setting up associations and abolished the restrictions applying in the acquisition of property by the foundations of religious sects. Retrials of cases on the basis of the decisions taken by the European Court of Human Rights were also made possible, paving the way for the retrial of some former Kurdish nationalists such as Leyla Zana.
The sixth reform package that entered into force in mid-July became widely famous for lifting the infamous Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law that defined propaganda against the indivisible integrity of the state as a criminal activity. The lifting of this Article together with the expansion of broadcasting in Kurdish to public as well as private radio and TV channels have been crucial in signifying the shift in the attitude of the Turkish state in favour of tolerance and further democracy in an environment conducive to reform, characterised by the lack of any significant acts of terrorism and the prevailing prospect of EU membership.
It is the last set of democratic reforms, however, which entered into force at the end of July, that has probably attracted the most attention, not because of the additional measures it has introduced to strengthen the fight against torture and the exercise of fundamental freedoms, but due to its emphasis on strengthening the civilian control of the military. The package has marked the end of the centralised role of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (NSC) as the implementing body of NSC decisions and as the coordinating institution between various ministries in policy-making. These functions have now been transferred to the Prime Minister who is also now given the right to appoint the General Secretaries of the NSC as the new amendments require that civilians can also be appointed to that post.
With these most recent reforms, military spending has also been placed under civilian control and the role of the NSC has been redefined in a more restricted sense, turning it into an advisory institution rather than a centralised decision-making body. All these recent reforms that aim to curb the omnipotence of the military in Turkish politics serve to abolish an established legacy that is derived from and representative of the conditions of the post-1980 military rule. Just like all the other reforms that have been passed, these also signal the shifts in Turkish domestic politics as a response to Europe as well as, to a lesser extent, to the growing demands from within the society.
As for legislation, one could state that it is so far, so good. The issue of implementation however, seems to be the more tricky part. Following the summit at Copenhagen, the government had stated on various occasions that its primary focus in the year 2003 would be on legislative reforms, in order to allow time for effective implementation in 2004. As most have been fulfilled in legal terms, signs of implementation have actually begun to emerge. Some of the legal changes, such as the increase in the number of civilian members of the NSC, can be easily implemented. The most problematic cases however are expected to occur with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. In that respect, Human Rights Boards have been established in cities and provinces, recording human rights abuses and responding to relevant complaints. A special board is also being set up composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior Affairs, General Secretariat for EU Affairs, the Human Rights Office of the Prime Minister and the Presidency of Human Rights Advisory Boards. This board will be responsible for monitoring all the implementation works and will take action in cases of non-compliance with the legislative measures.
These measures together with all the legal changes may boost optimistic scenarios with respect to the decision to open accession negotiations. However, it needs to be kept in mind that Turkey is not the sole actor in this long process of integration. While Turkey needs to demonstrate its sincerity by facilitating effective implementation, the EU should also convey the message by giving strong signals that it is serious about the prospect of Turkey’s eventual membership. Whether the EU genuinely wishes to see Turkey as a future member or as a partner with a special status is still a hotly debated issue in all circles in the country. The EU should take every opportunity to encourage each step in the reform process in order to strengthen the hand of pro-EU forces in Turkish society vis-à-vis the eurosceptics and hence to guarantee the alignment of Turkish democracy with EU standards.
