Azerbaijan to supply gas to Syria through Turkey, agreement signed

July 15, 2025 admin-dominor

By Alexander Miller, consultant in energy markets. Eurasia Business News, July 15, 2025. Article n°1629.

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been signed in Baku by Azerbaijan’s Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov, who also chairs the Supervisory Board of SOCAR, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic, and Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed al-Bashir, on July 12. The event coincided with President Sharaa’s first official visit to Azerbaijan, underlining the symbolic and strategic importance both sides attach to the burgeoning relationship.

The agreement outlines the export of approximately 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually from Azerbaijan to Syria. The gas will transit through Turkish territory, leveraging existing pipeline infrastructure, most notably the Kilis–Azaz–al Bab–Aleppo pipeline, which is operated by Turkey’s state energy company BOTAŞ.

This arrangement follows a prior bilateral deal between Turkey and Syria, concluded in May 2025, which authorized Turkey to begin direct supplies of natural gas to northern Syria—primarily to areas affected by fuel shortages, unstable electricity grids, and sporadic access to heating and cooking gas.

Strategic Context and Implications

The tripartite cooperation is more than a matter of energy logistics; it represents a strategic realignment in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, reshaping political and economic ties in a region long fractured by war, ideological rivalries, and external interventions.

1. Syria’s Post-War Reconstruction

Syria, after more than a decade of civil war, suffers from devastated infrastructure, including its energy sector. Many of its power plants are in ruins, transmission lines have been looted or destroyed, and fuel shortages remain acute—especially in Aleppo, Idlib, and parts of central and southern Syria.

By securing stable gas supplies, the government of President Sharaa— a former islamist warrior widely seen as a reformist figure trying to normalize Syria’s international relations—is making energy security a priority of national reconstruction. Natural gas will not only support electricity generation, but also boost industrial production, cooking and heating services, and potentially re-ignite economic activity in war-ravaged areas.

The agreement also comes amid increased humanitarian pressure, as Syria faces a brutal summer heatwave, coupled with electricity outages that leave millions without reliable power. Gas-fired generators are essential for hospitals, bakeries, and water pumping stations.

2. Azerbaijan’s Expanding Energy Diplomacy

For Azerbaijan, the move represents a further deepening of its role as a key energy supplier in the broader Eurasian and Middle Eastern theater. Baku has long positioned itself as a reliable partner to Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor, supplying Caspian gas via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Now, with this MoU, Azerbaijan diversifies its export geography while also enhancing its political capital in the Middle East. It also strengthens its energy diplomacy with Turkey, a country with which it shares deep linguistic, cultural, and political ties under the “one nation, two states” slogan.

The deal also provides economic dividends for SOCAR, which is seeking to expand its footprint in the MENA region, potentially including downstream investments and exploration ventures in Syria. Notably, both sides mentioned the possibility of future cooperation in oil and gas exploration, refining, and energy infrastructure development.

3. Turkey as a Regional Energy Hub

Turkey’s central role in the agreement reinforces Ankara’s ambition to become a regional energy hub. The country already acts as a transit corridor for gas from Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia to Europe. With this new arrangement, Turkey also becomes an energy provider and facilitator for post-conflict Syria, thus gaining leverage in both reconstruction diplomacy and regional energy security.

Ankara’s strategy has shifted in recent years from being merely a “bridge” to positioning itself as a central node in Eurasian energy flows. This shift has been accelerated by geopolitical changes, including Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas and the recent normalization efforts between Ankara and Damascus, spurred by shared security concerns and economic necessity.

Read also : Turkish companies to begin offshore oil and natural gas exploration off the coast of Pakistan

Moreover, the deal may further stabilize northern Syria, where Turkish-backed groups operate and Ankara’s influence is significant. Energy supplies could reduce public discontent, limit the influence of rival powers like Iran, and provide Turkey with a stabilizing presence near its border.

Energy, Geopolitics, and the New Syrian Administration

The visit of President Ahmad al-Sharaa to Baku is in itself an indicator of Syria’s shifting foreign policy posture, since he came to power in December 2024. While historically aligned with Russia and Iran, the new government in Damascus appears eager to rebalance Syria’s international relations by reaching out to countries like Azerbaijan and Turkey—both Sunni-majority, secular states with growing economic clout.

This pivot is pragmatic: rebuilding Syria will require diversified international partnerships, not only with traditional allies but also with emerging regional players capable of investing, supplying, and co-developing critical infrastructure.

It is worth noting that Russia and Iran, both of whom maintain a military and political presence in Syria, have not publicly opposed this new trilateral gas agreement. This may reflect either tacit acceptance or a calculation that improved energy supplies and stability could indirectly benefit their own interests, particularly in areas where power grids overlap.

What Comes Next? Opportunities and Challenges

The MoU is not a final supply contract but sets the framework for implementation negotiations, technical assessments, and commercial terms. Key areas to watch include:

Pipeline capacity and security: Ensuring uninterrupted flow of gas through a region still exposed to militant threats.
Payment mechanisms: How Syria, under sanctions and economic distress, will finance long-term gas purchases.
Regulatory frameworks: Potential role of international financial institutions or third-party observers in monitoring the gas delivery process.
Private sector involvement: Whether Azerbaijani or Turkish firms will be allowed to invest directly in Syria’s gas distribution networks or electricity production.

If successful, this agreement could pave the way for broader infrastructure investments, including power plants, LNG terminals, and industrial zones. It also offers a potential model for post-conflict energy diplomacy—where pragmatic cooperation can precede or accompany political normalization.

Conclusion

The July 2025 MoU between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Syria is more than a technical energy deal—it is a geopolitical signal. It reflects a reconfiguration of power and partnership in the Middle East, where energy is once again the currency of diplomacy, influence, and recovery.

For Syria, it brings hope of light amid darkness—literally and symbolically. For Azerbaijan, it strengthens its hand as a regional energy player with ambitions beyond the Caucasus. And for Turkey, it validates its vision of being the indispensable energy and political hub between Asia, Europe, and the Arab world.

As the gas starts to flow—if all goes according to plan—it may also mark the beginning of a new phase in regional diplomacy, one where pragmatism takes precedence over ideology, and where pipelines become paths toward peace.

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