Where is the mistake?

Starting from the end, those who had the opportunity to meet former President Ismet Inonu know that the response should be very well-thought, comprising of carefully selected words, formulated in a way to offend neither us nor the other side and be in line with our interests. This time, unfortunately, it did not turn out to be this way.

In order to understand what our mistake was, we have to find an answer to the question of what our Iraq policy was. A policy is formulated by the political will through the existing decision-making mechanism and is implemented with consciousness. Talking about an Iraq policy for Turkey is impossible in this sense. For almost four months, we negotiated three texts with Americans until they became ready for a signature. In the meantime, within the scope of a government proposal approved by Parliament, Americans started to modernize and expand Turkish airports in preparation for U.S. troops and military equipment expected to pass through Turkey to Iraq. Then came the March 1 vote. The government proposal requesting permission for deployment of U.S. troops was given 250 votes in support and 264 against. But when absentee votes were treated as negative votes, the result of the voting, which would have been considered positive anywhere else in the world, was deemed to be negative. And we treated this as the national will that must be respected. In the meantime, some 60,000 U.S. troops off the Mediterranean coasts of Turkey between Cyprus and Iskenderun swung back and fro in their ships for a month.

The chaos that came up as a result of this chain of contradictory and coincidental events cannot be called a policy. This tragicomic situation, which Mr. Erdogan said was "never" a mistake, has harmed Turkey’s critically important interests in relation to northern Iraq, Turkmens and the entire Iraq in an irremediable way.

Sure, we can tell the United States that we have made a mistake as well. There is one condition, however, to use this method that is not in line with diplomatic traditions. Americans, too, must admit that the Johnson letter, 1975-79 arms embargo, prevention of the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), indifference to Turkey’s losses stemming from the 1991 Gulf War, intervention in Turkish domestic politics and their efforts to give "legitimacy" to their favorite political parties were all mistakes on their part. If we are to make such a broad evaluation, then we also have to thank them for their contribution to our security over the last five decades, for their support in our fight against the PKK, their economic and military assistance for several years and for their support for our EU membership.

Indeed, the government must clearly confess to these grave political mistakes before the Turkish people, not the United States. Otherwise, there would be no way for a government that does not see the gravity of the situation to correct its mistakes.

If a policy fails, formation of an independent committee to investigate into reasons of the failure, a tradition in the West, might be useful. We cannot do this. But there is one thing apparent: At a time when the government was getting rid of its double-headed structure, that is, on March 1, the government motion was turned down. Mr. Erdogan, when he was elected a deputy on March 9, had already lost to a considerable extent his chances to enjoy an effective political power and even ended his political career before it started. Because he did not show the courage to put the motion to vote for a second time and dismiss some of the opposing deputies from the party. Today, haunted by this weakness, the Justice and Development (AK) Party is dissolving slowly. That is, the problem is about leadership of civilian politics, not that of the army.

Meanwhile, those Americans that came to be known as the strongest proponents of Turkey and based their policies on Turkey’s loyalty now feel disappointed. There are others who saw Turkey a "loyal ally", whose support is somehow "taken for granted". Besides disappointment, these people are angry with Turkey as well. But if we are expected to cooperate with the United States on, for example, Syria and Iran, we need to be given timely information on the nature of the policy that the United States will pursue and a detailed discussion of the outstanding issues, as well as a proper explanation to the public of the common positions of Turkey and the United States. Otherwise, our relations will not withstand another amateur theater production.