Türkiye’s changing family dynamics and demographics | Opinion
With a GDP of 1,108.45 billion U.S. dollars, Türkiye boasted the world’s 17th largest economy in 2023, according to the World Bank data and is working to move out of the middle-income class to join the ranks of developed countries. Alongside this challenge, Turkish society is going through sociological and demographic transformations that every developing country has previously experienced. On the one hand, the population is aging rapidly, and on the other hand, the urban population is consistently increasing. The structural changes Turkish society is undergoing manifest as aging, urbanization, modernization and sociological shifts.
One of the indicators of this deep transformation in Turkish society is identifiable in the changes in family structures. When examining the country’s marriage and divorce statistics for the year 2023, as published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), we see a social structure that is increasingly individualizing, with individuals increasingly avoiding starting a family. In this opinion piece, I have examined and interpreted the latest data on this issue.
Fewer marriages, more divorces
Considering the structural changes in Turkish society, some striking trends are evident: While the average age at first marriage is increasing among Turkish youth, the fertility rate, which indicates the number of children per woman, is consistently decreasing. This sociological change is particularly pronounced in western regions and urban city centers.
Firstly, regarding marriage data, according to the latest TurkStat statistics, the number of couples who got married last year was 565,000, representing a decline of 10,000 compared to the previous year. The crude marriage rate, which expresses the number of marriages per 1,000 people, was 6.63 per 1,000 in 2023. This rate, which peaked at over nine in 2005, has shown a steady decline since then.
In other words, over the last two decades, more and more Turks deferred marriage. Despite the population increasing significantly by 20 million, the number of marriages annually, which was 544,000 in 2001, stagnated at 565,000 last year. Moreover, the crude marriage rate has decreased by 21% between 2001 and 2023.
While the number of marriages is shrinking, the number of divorces has consistently increased in Türkiye. The number of divorces has doubled in two decades, reaching 171,881 by 2023, compared to 91,000 in 2001. The crude divorce rate, which expresses the number of divorces per 1,000 people, was 2.01 per 1,000 in 2023. Considering that this rate was only 1.41 in 2001, the recent two decades have shown a significant increase in divorce cases. In fact, 2022 set a record in the history of the country with a crude divorce rate of 2.15.
When divorces are examined according to the duration of marriage, 33.4% of the divorces in 2023 occurred within the first 5 years of marriage, and 21.7% occurred within 6-10 years of marriage. As a result of finalized divorce cases, 171,881 couples were divorced in 2023, and custody was granted to 171,213 children. In these cases, custody of the children was mostly given to the mother, with a rate of 74.9%. Another notable point is that while 96,000 children were given into custody in 2010, this number has almost doubled to 171,000 by 2023. This trend reflects a significant shift in the traditional family structure within Turkish society concerning the establishment of families and the sustainability of marriages.
Rising age at first marriage
In addition to the decline in family affiliation within Turkish society, the youth, especially Generation Z, prefer to marry at older ages. According to TurkStat data, the age at first marriage has increased for both genders. The average age at first marriage was 28.3 for men and 25.7 for women in 2023. In comparison, it was 26.0 for men and 22.7 for women in 2001. This trend of deferring marriage has shown a consistent increase over the years, without exceptions across the country, despite regional differences. In addition, the average age difference between men and women at first marriage has decreased from 3.3 years in 2001 to 2.6 years by 2023.
This change of attitude toward early marriage has striking effects on the average fertility rate in Türkiye. As I have explained in my many previous commentaries, there has been a significant decline in the fertility rate of Turkish women. Turkish women are increasingly choosing to marry at later ages, have children later and be content with fewer children. We see that the fertility rate in Türkiye, which was at 2.1 in 2017, decreased to 2.01 in 2018 and 1.97 in 2019. As of 2023, the fertility rate has further decreased to 1.51, which is a record low in the history of the republic. In comparison, the fertility rate was 2.38 at the beginning of the millennium.
A population growth rate below 2.1, which is the renewal rate of the population and referred to as the “golden ratio” (replacement level), indicates that a country is rapidly heading toward an aging crisis. As a result of the fertility rate declining to 1.51, the proportion of elderly individuals in the Turkish population has surpassed the critical level of 10% in 2023. This signals that Turkish society is becoming classified among aging societies.
Marriages to foreigners
An analysis of marriages involving foreigners reveals that in 2023 there were 6,345 foreign grooms, representing 1.1% of all grooms, while the number of foreign brides was 31,029, making up 5.5% of all brides.
Among foreign grooms, Germans ranked first with 21.9%. They were followed by Syrian grooms with 19.2% and Austrians with 5.1%. As for the foreign brides, Uzbeks ranked first with 12.0%, followed by Syrian brides with 11.3% and Azerbaijani brides with 9.1%.
These figures show that contrary to popular belief, Turkish society is not a closed-off and strictly conservative society resistant to integration with the world. On the contrary, with 8.5 million Turks living abroad, Turkish society is deeply integrated into the global society. Moreover, Turkish society, with its multicultural Ottoman heritage, is accustomed to encountering and living alongside different cultures and beliefs.
Striking regional variation
It must be emphasized that the crude marriage rate is not distributed evenly within the county. In the southeastern and eastern regions, where traditional social structures are more resilient, the marriage rate is higher. For instance, the highest crude marriage rate in 2023 was recorded in Kilis with 8.09 per 1,000, followed by Aksaray with 7.81 per 1,000 and Gaziantep with 7.57 per 1,000. On the other hand, there is a general trend of declining crude marriage rates as one moves towards western regions and urban city centers.
A striking difference between the eastern and western regions of the country, as well as between rural and urban, is evident in terms of crude divorce rates. The province with the highest crude divorce rate in 2023 was Izmir, with 3.05 per 1,000, followed by Antalya with 2.94 per 1.000. In contrast, Eastern regions show the lowest crude divorce rates. For instance, the lowest observed in Hakkari with 0.36 per 1,000, followed by Şırnak with 0.44 per 1,000 and Muş with 0.55 per 1,000. To illustrate the difference, while Izmir, as a representative region of the western parts of Türkiye, is 1.04 points higher than the national average, the top 10 provinces with the lowest crude divorce rates – all predominantly southeastern areas – are showing more than 1.5 points lower than the national average. This data indicates that modernization and erosion of family values are more pronounced in the predominantly modernized western regions compared to the east.
Understanding sociological change
For some essentialists, the data I have presented so far might seem quite alarming. However, I prefer to take a more analytical and liberal perspective on the debate. The sociological changes in Turkish society are not, and should not be seen as, alarming events in themselves. The country is undergoing social changes similar to those that all modernized, developed countries have experienced before. There is no need for an essentialist approach to interpret this data as an irreversible social disintegration or collapse. The problem does not originate from the change itself, but from failing to identify and respond to the needs of the changing population in terms of welfare, employment, education, social policies and public policies in general.
Extensive academic research is required for a deeper understanding of the transformation of Turkish society. Türkiye needs to invest in qualified research to understand the root causes and outcomes of these changes, rather than burying its head in the sand. This sociological change is a structural phenomenon and has deep ramifications in terms of the socio-economic sustainability of existing public structures. Unfortunately, Türkiye lacks extensive, multilayered and intergenerational research – such as the acclaimed World Values Survey – for analyzing the perceptions and requirements of the changing social structure, specifically Generation Z.
However, identifying and analyzing is not enough. As a welfare state, the country needs to start implementing extensive adjustments to its socioeconomic structures, such as social security and social services system, and labor market policies.
Protective and inclusive mechanisms largely built upon the strategy of strengthening the family structure are not sufficient in today’s Türkiye. For instance, considering that the number of people living alone reached 5.2 million in 2023 according to TurkStat data, or the high number of children placed into custody, the Turkish welfare regime should be realigned to meet the needs of single-parent families or one-person households.
In sum, the Turkish social structure is undergoing revolutionary transformations. Justice and Development Party (AK Party) policies have served as a catalyst for this evolution over the last two decades. The sociological and demographic shifts Türkiye is experiencing are particularly evident in population, urbanization and family structures. Rather than being alarmed, we should be prepared. These significant changes are bringing new challenges regarding the sustainability of Turkish socio-economic structures. Urgent policy adjustments are required, starting with the welfare state and labor market policies.
